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Editor's Notes

'In writing 'Progress and Poverty' he dipped his pen into the tears of the human race.....when he died....everywhere a feeling that a friend of the race had gone'

Memorial Address on Henry George

The articles in this Journal dealing as we do with problems facing the Third World, focus inevitably on the wide spectrum of world poverty and the ways being sought to bring progress in alleviation.

In this Number Ian Scott examines the failure of farming Co-operatives in Zambia due very largely to political factors and to the sad fact that Dr. Kaunda's vision which gave Co-operatives an important role in his original humanism philosophy for his country, was shared by all too few of his fellow countrymen.

Dr. Ogundimu rightly draws attention to the dangers in Nigeria of a proliferetion of Universities and of overstocking them with expatriates. But he goes on to equate University teaching skills with possession of a Ph D – the sooner Nigeria learns that great teachers do not necessarily hold doctorates (or honorary ones only conferred in old age) and great 'Doctors' do not necessarily have *teaching* skills, the better will it be for her education system.

Dr. Mathur emphasises the need for carefully planned appropriate training for civil service personnel concerned with rural development – as he points out, all too often they are ignorant of the rural situation, coming as many do from an elitist urban background.

The need for Developing Countries to evolve different budgetary structures from those pertaining in Industrialised States is emphasised by David Thompson in his general study of Third World budgeting procedures.

Satya Deva provides a lively case study – the Indian Seed Project: with almost breathless speed he races the reader through a complicated but important facet of rural development in Haryama. He concludes with suggestions as to how the Haryana Seeds Development corporation could improve the programme and help seed growers overcome many of their present difficulties.

Finally Dr. Okpala appraises public and para-statal housing in Nigeria and sees the answer to his country's great housing problem in the provision by the State of incentives to a private sector which would provide housing for the poor as well as the rich – a solution with which not everyone will agree

Ideology, Party and the Co-operative Movement in Zambia

IAN SCOTT*

Shortly after the attainment of independence in 1964, the Zambian government decided that the co-operative movement should play a central role in the country's rural development programme. National leaders saw the movement as an important solution to some of Zambia's most pressing post-independence problems. They believed that the formation of co-operatives – and particularly communal farming co-operatives – was ideologically desirable, would help solve the country's agricultural and unemployment problems and would enable the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) to turn its energies from the independence struggle to the tasks of mobilising the population for economic development. Accordingly, it

> 'became established Government policy that co-operative societies should become the spearhead of development programmes and... the main means by which the people should become directly involved in the Government's development policies... the concepts of the co-operative movement, which are so closely paralleled in traditional African philosophy, were fortunately ideally suited to this purpose, and it was, therefore, decided that a very special emphasis should be immediately laid on the crash expansion of the co-operative movement.'[1]

In the event, the majority of co-operatives set up as a result of this policy proved to be expensive and often dramatic failures. Although the number of registered societies increased five fold between 1964 and 1969, the total membership of the movement did not move much beyond 1964 levels (see Table I). Many societies quickly became moribund and the rate of repayment on government loans was low.

Many studies of Zambian co-operatives suggest that the explanation for this failure lay in an absence, or misapplication, of technical, management and planning skills.[2]

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[1] Republic of Zambia, Annual Report of the Department of Co-operatives, 1965.

[2] Most studies undertaken by government officers into co-operatives would fall into this category (for example, G. Olund, *Survey of Co-operatives* (mimeo, 1970) and the series of provincial reports concerned with the viability of individual co-operatives which were produced in 1973). In addition, see Y. Abt 'Integrated rural development in Zambia (1) a case study of the Kafubu-Kafulafuta project' in *KIDMA Israeli Journal of Development* Vol. 1 Part 4 (1974); S. Lombard *The Growth of Co-operatives in Zambia* 1914–71, (Lusaka: University of Zambia, Institute for African Studies, 1971); M. Lungu 'Co-operative Efficiency in Zambia' in C.G. Widstrand (ed.) *African Co-operatives and Efficiency* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs, 1972); E.G. Nadeau. 'A Comparison of Two Farmers' Co-operatives Unions in Northern Zambia: Problems of Productivity, Management and the Role of Members in Decision-Making'. (mimeo).

They point out that co-operatives were sometimes situated on poor soils far from their markets, that farm equipment rusted in the fields because of inadequate maintenance and that management problems disrupted many societies. In addition, there were problems of marketing, of credit and financing, of fertiliser supplies and of low or sporadic membership in the societies. Unquestionably the Zambian co-operative movement did suffer greatly from these problems. Yet the stress on these largely technical factors has often been at the expense of the wider considerations of co-operative policy and of the objectives and attitudes of politicians and senior civil servants.[1] I shall argue in this article that the conflicting policy objectives of the national and local political leadership and local level power and patronage systems are critical factors in explaining the failure of farming co-operatives. Particularly significant was the fact that it was in those areas of Zambia where the party was best organized and had the greatest amount of support that most co-operatives were established and the rate of failure was highest.

The impetus given to the formation of co-operatives came from the President himself. In his first major speech after independence, at Chifubu on the Copperbelt, Dr. Kaunda called on the unemployed:

'to form co-operatives, building co-operatives, co-operative societies... These people must come together. The money is there and the knowledge is there. We have lined up these things. We are waiting for the response from the country. The money is there for those who are prepared to work hard. To work hard with their brains, their minds, their hearts. It is a challenge to you, not to me. I am giving you the money. Come forward. I want to see you'.[2]

The effect of this speech was remarkable. In the first five months of 1965, there were 2,000 applications for registration of co-operative societies compared with five applications for registration in 1964.[3] Between 1964 and 1969, the government spent K14,120,000 on co-operatives, almost K12.5 million more than the colonial government had spent in the previous fifteen years.[4] As Table I shows, the financial input was matched by a rapid expansion in the number of co-operatives.

The central political leadership viewed the expansion in the number of co-operatives as a policy which made sound ideological, political and economic sense. Dr. Kaunda felt that it was the most practical expression of what later became the national and party ideology of Humanism. He said, for example, that

'In many ways the development of humanism in Zambia will depend on how successful we are in organising people's co-operatives.'[5]

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[1] For notable exceptions, see R. H. Bates *Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976) Ch 7; Quick 'Bureaucracy and Rural Socialism in Zambia' *Journal of Modern African Studies* 15, 3 (September 1977), S. Quick 'Socialism in One Sector: Rural Development in Zambia' in Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy (eds.) *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1979).

[2] Quoted in Colin Legum ed. *Zambia: Independence and Beyond – The Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda* (London: Thomas Nelson and Son, 1966), pp.211–212.

[3] Lombard op. cit. p. 18.

[4] *Ibid.* pp. 18–19.

[5] *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1967), p. 18.

TABLE1 *Co-operative Development in Zambia 1964–1973*

Year	Total number of societies	Total registered during year	Total dissolved during year	Total membership	Share capital (K)	Turnover (K)
1964	220	8	9	43,697	1.668m	11.535m
1965	468	264	16	49,724	1.716m	11.774m
1966	601	135	2	44,283	1.248m	9.982m
1967	875	274	5	52,637	1.340m	10.258m
1968	1,069	195	1	52,664	1.222m	11.199m
1969	1,121	52	—	44,670	1.407m	8.137m
1970	1,098	28	51	43,737	.712m	7.836m
1971	1,051	27	74	42,347	1.291m	10.452m
1972	962	23	117	45,415	1.187m	15.518m
1973	934	19	47	49,467	1.450m[1]	4.200m*

Source: Annual Report of the Department of Co-operatives, 1973 p. 8.
*Figures in the body of the report put share capital at K1.2 million in 1973 and turnover at K5.6 million. The figures for 1972 and 1973 look suspect.

Through the co-operative, Dr. Kaunda thought that it would be possible to realise certain traditional values in the modern state. In particular, traditional society had three major characteristics which he thought should be emulated. First, it was a 'mutual aid' society, 'organized to satisfy the basic human needs of its members.'[1] Second, it was an 'accepting' society in which 'the slow, the inept and the incapable' were valued as much as more productive members of the community.[2] Third, Dr. Kaunda saw traditional society as an 'inclusive' society in which bonds were woven between members of the community.[3] Membership in the society implied some degree of responsibility for its continuing operation. From these premises, it followed that Zambia should pursue a development strategy which permitted the country to develop communally and collectively. And for these purposes the communal farming co-operative seemed ideally suited.

The communal farming co-operative was seen not only as the embodiment of traditional values but also as the solution to the problem of class conflict. Although a humanist in Dr. Kaunda's view must be a socialist, conflict between classes was not the road to socialism. Traditional African Society, he believed, was both socialist and classless and, in the modern environment, the state should intervene to defend traditional values and prevent class formation. Co-operatives, and particularly communal farming co-operatives, formed the bridge between the values and structure of traditional society and the desirable utilization of modern technology

[1] *Ibid.* pp. 5–6.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 6.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 6.

for the benefit of the citizen. There was thus a strong degree of official approval – although no compulsion – for farming co-operatives to establish themselves on a communal basis. A sample survey of 330 farming co-operatives (of a total of 587) in 1970 showed that 290 were farming on a communal basis.[1]

If Dr. Kaunda's idealism provided the impetus for government's encouragement of co-operatives, then the policy won the support of many of his ministers because it seemed to offer a viable solution to the country's agricultural problems and probably also because loans to co-operatives were seen as a useful device for retaining local level political support. Commercial agriculture in Zambia at independence was almost entirely in the hands of white farmers. It was widely anticipated that these farmers would leave Zambia and, indeed between 1964 and 1969, some 40 to 60 per cent of them did so.[2] Government expected that the resulting shortfall in agricultural production would be met by increased production for the market by farming co-operatives. Ultimately, co-operatives were seen as the means by which Zambia would grow all its own food requirements. At the same time, co-operatives were also expected to solve the problem of the rural – urban drift and to harness the energies of the rural population. Governments expectations were well summed up by the then Minister of Rural Development, Reuben Kamanga, when he said

'Ten good farmers earning K200.00 per year are a greater national asset than one good farmer earning K2,000 while nine subsistence farmers are left earning nothing. We are after production by the masses, not mass production.[3]

It says something of the failure of co-operative, and more widely of agricultural, policy that by 1977 the remaining 300 white farmers were still producing 60% of all agricultural production.[4]

Dr. Kaunda's ministers were probably also looking to their own local bases of support in their enthusiasm for co-operatives. Loans to co-operatives, and particularly to local party officials, could be turned to their own political advantage. Nalumino Mundia, when he was the deputy leader of the opposition, charged that co-operatives were being used 'as a means of organising UNIP as a party' and he alleged some co-operatives in the Western province had been closed by district governors because some of their members had stood as ANC candidates. In his reply, in the National Assembly, Kamanga maintained that 'UNIP has been helping to organise co-operatives and not the co-operatives to organise UNIP'.

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[1] Republic of Zambia, Survey of Farming Co-operatives, March 1970. This was a sample of seven of the eight provinces. Unfortunately, there were no returns for the Southern province. The traditional pattern of individual tenure in that province would probably have had an adverse effect on attempts to persuade farmers to farm communally.

[2] C.S. Lombard and A.H.C. Tweedie *Agriculture in Zambia Since Independence* (Lusaka: Neczam, 1972) p. 52

[3] Quoted in C. Stephen Lombard, *The Growth of Co-operatives in Zambia 1914–71* (Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1971).

[4] *The Economist.* 17–23 December, 1977.

However, there were formal links between the centre and the local levels with the requirement in the Humanism document that every minister and MP should belong to a co-operative. Nonetheless, the evidence remains circumstantial and there is little information concerning the ways in which central politicians worked with the co-operatives.

The new political emphasis on the formation of co-operatives initially received an enthusiastic response from the Department of Co-operatives. It soon became clear, however, that there were major administrative problems in implementing the policy. The vastly increased government expenditure on co-operatives was not reflected in increases in the number of staff in the department, improvements in their skills or in additional training facilities. Despite the almost five-fold increase in the number of co-operatives in the five years after independence, the actual staff position in the Department only increased from 132 officers in 1965, to 137 in 1966, to 159 in 1967 and dropped back to 139 in 1969.[1] There was an increase in establishment in 1970 and the actual posts filled rose to 186. But, as the Director noted in 1972, the increase in numbers was at the expense of quality.

'There was a substantial in-take of school-leavers to vacant posts of Senior Co-operative Assistants due to the fact that even applicants who failed to pass their Form V examinations were taken on.'[2]

Given the constraints of staff, the Department took the decision, in late 1967, that no new co-operatives would be registered and that efforts would be concentrated on making existing co-operatives viable. As Dresang describes it,

'Despite this change in departmental policy, UNIP officials, including President Kaunda, continued to urge the establishment of more societies. Thus, a confrontation developed. Personnel in the Department of Co-operatives either ignored the efforts of UNIP or actively worked to counter UNIP's impact.'[3]

The Cabinet was not finally won over to the Department's view until 1970 when a new bill was introduced in Parliament to strengthen government's control over the societies. At the same time, efforts were made to rationalise existing societies and to deregister those which were defunct.

Clearly, there were, for a time, conflicting views of the objectives of co-operative policy in the minds of leading politicians and civil servants. Equally clearly, however, the central politicians and the local UNIP officials had even greater differences in their interpretations of what co-operative policy meant. Humanism required that party officials should play active roles in the formation of co-operatives. In general, they approached this task with a good deal of enthusiasm. It was not always, however, a response to the ideological directives of Dr. Kaunda or the more practical consideration of feeding Zambia. Usually, officials emphasised the personal financial benefits that might be obtained from forming co-operatives and

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[1] *Annual Reports of the Department of Co-operatives* 1965–1969
[2] *Annual Report of the Department of Co-operatives* 1972
[3] Dennis Dresang, 'Development Administration' (mimeo, n.d.)

suggested that these benefits were a consequence of the role UNIP officials had played in winning independence. Thus Quick, in a study of thirteen co-operatives in Eastern Province, found that party officials stressed

'the idea that Government was prepared to give subsidies, loans and tractors to the new co-operatives and intimated that these were rewards from the Government for those who had been active in the independence struggle'.[1]

In the Serenje district of Central Province, the following example shows the way in which a group of officials might benefit from establishing a co-operative.

'The Presidents's 'call to the land' in 1965 opened up a period of intense activity on the part of the Serenje UNIP organisation... All but one of (the)... co-operatives were sponsored by the Party and the involvement of the Party has continued to be an important factor in the story of co-operatives in Serenje district... In particular the lenience and generosity afforded to certain co-operatives in the first few years of their existence reveal a definite correlation with the political influence of their leaders for services rendered.

The first co-operative to be registered in Serenge was the Munte Farming Co-operative. It was formed by Branch Officials from Chief Kabamba's area who moved to Kabundi in Chief Muchinda's area to start farming on the far side of the river Sasa. The site lay about 50 miles from Serenge and could only be reached via a poor road and an even poorer bridge... It is clear that the Party regarded Munte as a pioneer project and did everything to further its progress...

The Munte farmers... spared no effort in obtaining every loan, credit and benefit which Government was prepared to give them. This was, after all, what they had been promised. Unfortunately, financial control was lacking and when, in 1967, an attempt was made to bring the books up to date, it was discovered that vast sums had been spent on consumer goods, food, drinks, trips to the line of rail and personal expenditure instead of being limited to the agricultural requisites.'[2]

Despite these indications of financial mismanagement and misuse of the loans, Government continued to give this co-operation considerable assistance, providing tractors, planters and insecticides. In 1969, the ten co-operative members were given an additional loan of K5,400. The inescapable conclusion is that Munte Co-operative received assistance because its office-bearers were influential local party men. The co-operative was never really viable. From the beginning, the yields from the maize crop were small and they declined over time. Between 1965 and 1970, the co-operative was only able to repay some K500. But it was not until 1970 that the Provincial Co-operative Officer finally declared it defunct.

The Munte example is not a-typical. In the Serenje district as a whole, twelve of thirteen co-operatives were formed by party officials. These co-operatives, by 1971, had borrowed a total of K82,000 but had repaid under K10,000. Only eighty people were members of the co-operatives.[3] Throughout Zambia, the national objectives of co-operative policy and the economic viability of the co-operatives themselves were affected by the often rapacious attitude of local party officials to

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[1] Stephen Quick, 'Aspects of Co-operative Development in Eastern Province' (mimeo, n.d.).

[2] *Case Studies in Development: Research Project on Administration for Rural Development – Co-operatives* (mimeo, April, 1972).

[3] Bates, in his study of co-operatives in the luapula province, shows that membership in the co-operatives there was also very low. Robert H. Bates *Rural Responses to Industrialization* op. cit.

government loans, subsidies and services. In 1970, when the first large scale survey of farming co-operatives was undertaken by the Department, it was discovered that some a very large number of co-operatives were defunct. Since almost everyone of these co-operatives had been established in the preceeding four years, they were too short-lived to experience and over-come on-going production and management problems. Indeed, it was not always even a question of over-coming management and technical problems. The co-operatives were often simply paper societies set up by influential party officials to exploit government's generosity.

The local party's response to the call for the establishment of co-operatives had two consequences. First, because party officials had a direct financial interest in government loans, they sought to prevent additional members from joining the co-operative. This meant that the average membership of co-operative societies was very low (see Table II). And it fell still further when government's credit policy tightened in 1970 after the failure of the loan-granting institution, the Credit Organization of Zambia. Thus, although government had seen the co-operative movement as a means for the mass mobilisation of the population, there were in fact fewer members of the movement in 1973 than there had been in 1965. For farming co-operatives, the average membership had, by 1973, fallen slightly below the legal minimum of numbers required for establishing a co-operative. A combination of credit policy and the closed shop operated by party officials effectively prevented the realisation of the national politician's formal objective of involving the majority of the rural population in the movement.

A second consequence which stemmed from the local party's response to co-operative policy was that co-operatives were established primarily in those areas of the country where UNIP had a strong party organization. Historically, UNIP's organization had grown unevenly. During the First Republic (1964–1973) the party had a well-developed organization along the line of rail, on the Copperbelt, in

TABLE 2 *Membership and Average Membership in Farming Co-operatives 1965–1973*

Year	Number of Co-operatives	Membership	Average Membership*
1965	132	4,581	35
1966	240	5,157	21
1967	466	7,630	16
1968	609	11,500	19
1969	Not Available		
1970	587	8,644	15
1971	Not Available		
1972	535	6,686	12
1973	509	4,890	10

Source: Calculated from the Annual Reports of the Department of Co-operatives 1965–1970, 1972, 1973. Figures for 1970 have been derived from Republic of Zambia, Survey of Farming Co-operatives, March 1970.

*Average Membership figures have been rounded.

the Northern, Luapula and Eastern provinces and in parts of Central province. After independence, in these areas, the party was very quickly able to set up a patronage system. Through pressure on civil servants, party officials were able to ensure that the channelled government resources to themselves and to loyal party supporters. In other parts of the country, however, it was more difficult for the party to operate such a system. In the Southern, and Western provinces and in parts of Central province, UNIP faced entrenched opposition which cut away its support and its contact with the people. Civil servants in these areas were not subject to the same degree of party pressure and co-operatives, in particular, tended to be established on the basis of criteria which had little to do with the patronage system. There is, then, as Table III shows, a direct correlation between the strength of UNIP's organisation and the numbers and location of farming co-operatives. Thus, when Siddle observes that

'It is difficult to account for some regional variations in the number of co-operatives... The surprising large number of co-operatives in Luapula (156) contrasts rather strangely with the smaller number in the agriculturally more advanced and more populars Southern province.'[1]

the anomaly can be explained by the greater strength of the UNIP organisation – and its consequently greater control over patronage – in the Luapula province. In many provinces where the UNIP organisation was influential in the decision-making process:

'C(redit) O(rganization) of Z(ambia) officers were the local UNIP representatives who regarded the extension of easy credit as a political rather than a financial activity.'[2]

TABLE 3 *Membership of Farming Co-operatives By Province, 1970*

Province	Number of Co-operatives	Membership	Average Membership*
Central	101	1,346	13
Copperbelt	44	768	17
Eastern	58	1,535	28
Luapula	166	1,972	12
Northern	81	1,314	16
North-Western	66	857	13
Southern	44	548	12
Western	27	304	11
Total	587	8,644	15

Source: Republic of Zambia, Survey of Farming Co-operatives, March, 1970.
*Average membership figures have been rounded.

[1] D.J. Siddle, 'Co-operatives' in D. Hywel Davies, ed., *Zambia in Maps* (London: University of London Press, 1971) p. 64.
[2] Case Studies in Development op. cit.

TABLE 4 *Farming Co-operatives By Province, 1973*

Province	Number of Co-operatives	Numbers Recommended For Liquidation	Percentage Recommended For Liquidation
Central	105	45	43
Copperbelt	12	—	—
Eastern	56	24	43
Luapula	147	95	65
Northern	80	31	39
North-Western	41	N.A.	N.A.
Southern	35	6	13
Western	20	2	10

Source: In 1973, the Department of Co-operatives undertook a survey of all farming co-operatives in Zambia with a view to rationalizing their operation and liquidating those with low membership and poor prospects. Table 4 has been derived from these studies which were conducted on a provincial basis

Co-operatives were not in the main established on the basis of criteria which related to their productive capacity. If the primary objective of party officials was to obtain financial advantages from the government, management, planning and technical skills had very little relevance. The siting of a co-operative on fertile land was of less importance than the steady flow of government funds; indeed co-operatives were often deliberately sited on poor soils because government was willing to pay (in the early post-independence days) a stumping subsidy of K30 per acre and, on poorer soils, trees are smaller and more easily up-rooted.

The way in which the local party became involved in co-operatives serves to explain the failure of a large number of farming co-operatives. In many areas of Zambia, it meant low membership in the co-operatives (as party officials sought to protect their privileged position) and the frequent siting of co-operatives in inappropriate places. As Table IV shows, the mortality rate among farming co-operatives was highest in those areas where the party was strongest. Given this pattern of development one might have expected some differences in the performance of co-operatives in these areas where the party was not strong. However, despite the fact that co-operatives in these areas were more likely to survive, they tended to be almost as unsuccessful in the long run as in other areas of the country. In the Southern province there was considerable initial resistance to the establishment of communal farming co-operatives. Individual family farms were the major unit of organisation and many farmers, in addition, belonged to a successful marketing union. The opposition party, the African National Congress chose to interpret co-operatives as communist and, UNIP politicians conceded, were very effective in doing so.[1] Even where UNIP did play a role in encouraging co-operatives, it was not always able to establish a co-operative as part of its own patronage system. In general, it was the

[1] *Minutes of the Gwembe Humanism Seminar* (mimeo, 3 October 1969).

District Co-operative Officer who played the major role in explaining formal procedures and ensuring that co-operatives were set up on a viable basis.

In the co-operatives in the Southern and Western province, it does seem that the primary source of failure lay in a variety of maintenance, management and supply problems. Mazabuka region in the Southern province may serve as an example. The region is one of the most fertile and agriculturally prosperous areas in Zambia. Large scale commercial agriculture has been practised in the area almost since the establishment of the colonial regime. The region is one of largest producers of maize and it has extensive sugar estates at Nakambala. Such an area seems ideal for the establishment of co-operatives. However, possibly because the region was devoted to large scale agriculture, farming co-operatives were not encouraged in Mazabuka. In 1971, there were three poultry co-operatives and eight co-operatives engaged in building and supplying sand for buildings. I visited the three poultry co-operatives in Mazabuka in 1969 and 1971. In two of them, there were no chickens visible in either year. I was told that they had been recently sold for the market and that members were waiting for a new supply of chicks. In the interim, the co-operatives were inactive. The third poultry co-operative was viable but hardly typical. It was located at the Mazabuka Agricultural Research Station with an abundance of technical advice literally on its door-step. Essentially, the movement was bedevilled by poor organization or by factors which often seemed well beyond the control of the co-operative members themselves.

What does the Zambian experience of farming co-operatives tell us? From the analysis so far, I think that it is clear that there were important conflicting policy objectives and that political factors were critical to the failure of the co-operatives. Yet there appeared to be little recognition of this in the response of the Department of Co-operatives. After 1973, the Department liquidated many existing or moribund societies and sought to bring about a fundamental change whereby communal farming societies were replaced by individual family farms. Co-operatives were to be of a multipurpose character and would essentially provide services to the members. No society was to be established unless it covered an area greater than 30 km in radius; that within that area there should be an expectation of at least 300 members; that at the outset there should be at least 50 active farming members selling produce valued at more than K10,000; and that soils in the area should be suited to permanent agriculture. This reflected the Department's view of the reasons for the failure of the communal farming co-operatives which were that they were 'located without reference to the agricultural potential of areas and with the membership essentially made up of subsistence farmers'; that they 'were inspired and promoted from above and fostered by the Department of Co-operatives with little attempt to assess how these societies could develop into self-sufficient independent organisation with the emphasis on self-reliance'; and, finally, that they suffered from their 'dependence on outside agencies for services'.[1] Apart from the fact that the original ideological emphasis on communal farming societies has been completely removed by the Department's new policy, there is no reason to believe

[1] 'Agricultural Co-operatives' in *National Co-operative Development Plan* (mimeo, 1976).

that the emphasis on larger societies providing services will solve the political problem. Indeed, as Von Donge showed in his study of the Eastern Province Producer Marketing Co-operative, it is relatively easier to dominate a larger society. The difference may simply be that domination comes from the centre rather than from local party officials as in the past.

The political element is essential to an explanation of the demise of the communal farming co-operative. The co-operatives were created, for the most part, in areas of great party strength and they failed, in disproportionately large numbers, in those areas. Party officials adapted the formal objectives of co-operative policy of feeding the nation and prompting the ideology to their own ends; many believed that loans to co-operatives were personal rewards, the just fruits of participation in the independence struggle. Loans to the co-operative movement became part of the patronage system and were restricted to small groups of party officials. The local party did not seek to involve the population in the movement and did not play a mobilisation role. Considerations of power and patronage were paramount. Central control was for the most part absent or, at best, fitful. Under such circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that so many co-operatives collapsed.

The failure of farming co-operatives resulted in an implicit change in the nature of the ideology itself. In the end, Dr. Kaunda's vision of the communal co-operative as the embodiment of the society's ideological aspirations was shared by very few people at the national or at the local level. For most of those involved in co-operatives, it was a convenient means of securing short-term employment in the rural areas, often as a prelude to migration to the line of rail. They formed co-operatives when loans were easy to secure and they drifted out of them when government's credit policy tightened. There was no notion of the co-operative as a means of introducing new values and of bringing about a new way of life. With the failure of the co-operatives, the stress on communal co-operatives, so strong in the mid-1960s, was replaced by 1973 with emphasis on individual family farms and multi-purpose co-operatives. There is little mention of co-operatives in the revised version of Humanism published in 1974 or in the UNIP policy manifesto for 1974–1984. The attempt to inculcate humanist or socialist values through the co-operative movement has been abandoned in the face of conflicting, and often overriding, political objectives and of the declining importance of the ideology itself.

Nigerian Universities Under the 1979 Constitution

BANIDELE A. OGUNDIMU*

In the 1963 Republican Constitution, education was on the concurrent legislative list. This enabled region/states and the federal governments to legislate on the subject at all levels.[1] The situation remained unchanged until 1972 when the military administration amended the constitution by decree to place University Education on the Federal Exclusive Legislative List. Several reasons were given for this change[2]:

i It was necessary to halt the trend towards the establishment of a University in each state, particularly as states had grown from four in 1963 to twelve by July 1967 and there was agitation for the creation of more states;

ii if the multiplication of universities was not checked, controlled, and planned by a central authority Nigerian Universities might devalue academic excellence to an intolerable level as states without adequate financial ability exercised their legislative power to establish glorified secondary schools which would go by the name of Universities;

iii it was necessary to use university development as a weapon in the struggle to forge national unity. This could be done by siting universities in a way that would ensure an equitable spread throughout the country and ensuring that student population in each university reflected the diversity of the nation. It was noted that hitherto a state university tended to offer most of its admissions to applicants who were indigenes of the state in question.

These were laudable reasons for federalising university affairs. Whether the objectives have been achieved (and to what extent) is a different issue. The issue is certainly beyond the scope of these brief comments.

UNIVERSITIES IN THE 1980's

Nigeria is a federation of nineteen states. Under the new constitution the country is being ruled by a President for the federation and nineteen state governors. By placing university education on the concurrent legislative list, the 1979 constitution (P. 104)[3] confers the power to create and maintain new universities on twenty

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[1] Fafunwa, A.B., *A History of Nigerian Higher Education*, Lagos: Macmillan, 1971.

[2] Fafunwa, A.B., *History of Nigerian Education*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974.

[3] Nigeria. *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979*, Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1978.

governments whereas only one government currently holds such power. The implications of this constitutional diffusion of power over university affairs are very serious. We identify three major ones: (1) excessive expansion; (2) a significant lowering or, at least, differentiation of academic standards between and among the universities; (3) the advent of academic neo-colonialism in Nigerian Universities.

The military administration which centralised power over university affairs seems to have succeeded only moderately in its efforts to keep multiplication of universities to the minimum.
Although it has prevented the emergence of nineteen state universities, it has also succumbed to pressure from the states by creating seven new universities to bring the national total to thirteen. It appears that the immediate effect of the devolution of power under the new constitution will be increased pressure for the creation of new universities in states where none exists. This can happen in one of two ways. If the Federal Government is anxious to preserve its exclusive control of universities it may decide to establish a university in each of the seven states that have none – Ogun, Ondo, Imo, Niger, Bauchi, Benue and Gongola. Already some of the registered political parties are busy making election promises to establish universities in these seven states (Nigerian Daily Times, 1979).[1]

However the Federal Government may decide, wisely in our view, to digest what it has already swallowed; that is, develop the new universities created in 1975 to at least medium size (this is defined as 5,000 students in the Nigerian educational establishment)[2] and be sure it can feasibly finance more universities before any additional university is created in future. In that case, the aggrieved states may seize the initiative by exercising their legislative power to create universities. Either way, the result is likely to be excessive expansion of the national university system within the next ten years. It should be observed too that states where federal universities now exist will also have the power to build state universities if they so wish. The possibility that some of them will exercise the option cannot be reasonably ruled out.

Excessive expansion creates problems that are likely to erode academic standards in these universities. The Federal Government is the wealthiest government in the Federation. In spite of its relatively enormous resources it has run into financial problems partly because of over-commitment of its resources to educational expansion at all levels (Ogundimu 1978a)[3]. The thirteen federal universities now operate on shoe-string budgets because of severe and unreasonable cuts in their budgetary requests. The government has been constrained to instruct the new seven

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[1] *Nigerian Daily Times*, Tuesday 13 February, 1979, p. 1. See also *New Nigerian* Monday 12 February, 1979, p. 1.

[2] Ike, V.C., *University Development in Africa*: *The Nigerian Experience*, Ibadan; Oxford University Press, 1976.

[3] Ogundimu, B.A., 'The Political Economy of Educational Planning in Nigeria,' Paper delivered at the Fourth Quadrennial International Conference on Educational Administration, The University of British Columbia, May 1978 (a)

universities to lower their ambitions by reducing the scope of their approved master plan for physical development. What this means is that the federal government is finding it difficult to provide adequate physical plants and equipment to enable the universities perform their functions. Should the Federal Government be forced to build seven additional universities within the next ten years the university system might well collapse under the weight of poverty. Assuming the state governments create the additional universities, the financial implications can be expected to be worse. Most of the states' budgets consist of federal statutory allocations which fluctuate as federal fortunes fluctuate. One may conclude, then, that if the Federal Government cannot adequately finance universities, none of the states can.

There is a second danger posed by excessive expansion of universities. The secondary schools are not increasing in number at the rate the universities are being multiplied. That implies that the universities would eventually be scraping the bottom of the barrel before they can admit enough number of students. Even with thirteen universities, the phenomenon is already discernible. If it is plausible to argue that the most skillful smith cannot turn silver into gold, then we should realistically expect, over time, a lower standard of academic excellence in the graduates of these universities.

A similar but not identical argument can be made with respect to university teachers. A Ph.D degree is currently regarded as the normal qualification for teaching in Nigerian universities. Ph.Ds cannot possibly be produced at the rate demand for them is being escalated by university expansion. Although a certain amount of the circulation of elites is essential for the proper functioning of a social system, it is highly restricted in Nigeria for reasons that are not relevant here. Nigerian university teachers, the academic élite, do not circulate well. The outcome is that most of them, particularly the most distinguished, are concentrated in a few universities in the south. As the universities multiply the newest ones are likely to have more than their fair share of mediocre teachers. One possible consequence of this will be the loss of the current parity of degrees awarded by Nigerian universities. The surrender value of a Nigerian degree will then become a function of which university the graduate attended.

Finally, we argue that the excessive expansion of the university system which we have predicted will also generate a situation that will be politically unpalatable to concerned and enlightened citizens, and to government itself. A frenetic effort at creating university teaching positions (which expansion entails) will usher in a prolonged period of academic neo-colonialism through the preponderance of foreign teachers in the universities. The supply of Nigerian Ph.Ds is even now inadequate. The prospect that the supply will be markedly increased in the near future is not bright. The main reason is that the conditions of service and remunerations of university teachers have worsened substantially relative to those of other public servants since January, 1975. The consequence is manifested in two ways; the steady desertion of the university by teachers, and less success in attracting suitable first degree holders to undergo graduate studies in preparation for a teaching career in the universities.

Given the situation we have described, the universities will have to take recourse to massive recruitment of foreign teachers. This, in turn, will create two other problems. On the one hand, can Nigeria, in political terms afford to have the commanding heights of her educational system dominated by expatriates two to three decades after her independence? This is a question for the political authorities to address. On the other hand, would a preponderance of expatriate teachers in the universities be in the best interest of these institutions? We may attempt an answer to this question. To begin with, we concede the argument that some internationalism in the composition of teaching staff in a university cannot but be beneficial. However, realism would suggest that a ceiling should be put to the proportion of the teachers who may be non-nationals. A policy decision must be taken as to what proportion of the academic community should be nationals of the country before the academic community can, in essence, be regarded as Nigerian. The Association of African Universities has expressed a similar view (Yesufu 1973)[1]. Put differently, beyond internationalism there is nationalism; and in the world in which we live nationalism is stronger than internationalism.

Furthermore, the pattern of recruitment of expatriate teachers can also be problematic. They may be recruited from a homogeneous region of the world e.g. Britain, USA, or USSR. Recruitment may not even consider regional characteristics. Either way, the issue of neo-colonialism remains, more confounding in the latter alternative. Every academic is a human being who has been brought up in a specific society with an educational system designed to serve the interests of that social order. The fact that he has been raised in that society and certified in that educational system suggests that the academic has imbibed to a very high degree the values promoted by that social order. The question arises as to whether teachers so socially conditioned, without any personal stake in the future of Nigeria (for any host country for that matter), and probably hostile to the aspirations of the host country should be entrusted, in the main, to mould the outlook of the country's future elites, and to determine the internal structures and scholarly priorities of her universities. When expatriates predominate and they come from different educational and cultural backgrounds they cannot but create chaos in the national university system they control *since they bring systems with divergent values to bear on the resolution of issues in a system that is not theirs and from which they can opt out any time.*[2].

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Considering the nature of Nigerian politics and the recent noises being made by politicians, it seems reasonable to assume that the worst will happen and the building of new universities will take place within the first four years (1980–83) of the Presidential Constitution.

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[1] Yesufu, T.M. (ed.) *Creating the African University*, Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1973.

[2] Ogundimu, B.A., 'The Crisis of University Management I: April/May 1978 Revisited,' *National Universities Bulletin*, September 1978 (b)

If this prognosis is plausible, what can be done to manage the problematic future that has been predicted above? It seems imperative that these universities should rethink their personnel policy. One may begin by defining, *a priori*, a Nigerian academic community as one whose membership is 80% Nigerian. It should be the goal of the university administration to have 80% of the academic staff in each department in a new university be Nigerians by the end of the university's first ten years. Inevitably expatriates will predominate in the academic staff of a rapidly expanded university system. Policy should be aimed at minimizing the period of this inevitable academic neo-colonialism. This can be done by adopting several measures simultaneously.

The trend in recent years has been to require a would-be Nigerian university lecturer to possess a doctorate degree whereas an expatriate with a master's degree would normally be appointed to a full lectureship. This policy, quite apart from discriminating against Nigerians in their own country, is unrealistic if the wish is to Nigerianise the academic staff rapidly in a period of rapid expansion. It seems to this writer that any appointable person, Nigerian or expatriate, with an acceptable master's degree should be appointed to a full lectureship. We define an acceptable master's degree as a master's degree earned after successfully pursuing a programme of studies involving formal course work and the writing of a thesis. Staff development programmes should be available to enable such Nigerian lecturers to upgrade their credentials as soon as possible after initial appointment. This measure should quicken the pace of Nigerianization while still making possible the maintenance of at least minimally acceptable standard of undergraduate education. An immediate closure of Schools of Basic Studies will also release a sizeable number of misemployed and underemployed holders of master's and doctorate degrees who can be absorbed into the new universities where they will be more appropriately utilized. With all the universities developing four-year undergraduate programmes the closure of the Schools of Basic Studies is overdue. Their closure is also consistent with the letters and spirit of the National Policy on Education (1977)[9].

The effective control of Nigerian universities by Nigerians can be enhanced by insisting that every expatriate teacher be barred from holding administrative positions. It is not enough to aim at 80% Nigerian staff. The hold of foreigners on Nigerian higher education policy should somehow be weakened before the policy objective of 80% Nigerian membership of the academic staff is achieved. Even when the objective is achieved the power of number can be effectively neutralised by the power of administrative authority if expatriates are not confined exclusively to teaching duties. Utilizing the services of expatriate teachers solely on teaching duties can also be expected to have a salutary effect on the development of graduate studies in Nigerian universities and thus promote a faster production of higher degree holders who can take up teaching positions in sister universities.

Physical development is another area in which policy should be infused with realism. The need here is to save money, to construct more building spaces with

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[1] Nigeria. *National Policy on Education*, Lagos: Federal ministry of Information, 1977.

substantially less money than hitherto. The policy change that is needed is a formal lowering of the architectural extravagance that the earlier Nigerian universities indulged in. Considerations for functionalism and comfort should predominate in the design of university buildings, while the thirst for grandeur should be sublimated if not completely extirpated. Finally, subsidy-consuming facilities like hostels and catering services should be reformed in a way that will make them self-supporting. The management of such facilities should take advantage of economies of scale to make some modest profit and to keep the charges for using these facilities within the means of the average student.

Administrative Training and Rural Development: Recent Experience in Rajasthan, India

HARI MOHAN MATHUR*

Paradoxical as it might sound, many administrators in Third World countries, where poverty is all-pervasive, do not know enough about the poor concentrated mainly in the rural areas. Usually the administrators come from the higher strata of urban society. Ignorant of the ways of the city dwellers, the rural poor generally hesitate to come forward to seek assistance which administrators and their organizations are supposed to provide. This administrator–people gap explains why the package of welfare and development services meant for the poor is not always delivered to them and often ends up benefiting the segments of society that already are well-to-do.

The low priority assigned to rural development in the past has in fact tended to produce both a scarcity of trained manpower for development jobs in the rural areas as well as attitudinal and behavioural patters amongst the city-bred administrators which are wholly out of tune with the new directions in which these societies wish to move.

However there is a growing awareness that all-round social and economic progress is to a large extent dependent on the efficient day-to-day management of development policies and programmes particularly at the grassroots level, and that administrative capability can be built up fairly quickly and at a modest cost by carefully planned training programmes. Most appraisal reports on rural development projects prepared by the international aid agencies and other funding institutions now clearly enumerate, usually in a separate appendix at the end of the document, the specific training needs of the staff to be engaged on various assignments and the ways in which these must be met.

In the context of great importance which currently has come to be attached to rural development, the two main considerations strongly favouring this increased emphasis on the preparation of the development personnel are: (a) The need to equip the growing army of development workers with the knowledge and skills relevant to their job which are getting more and more complex, and (b) The need to familiarise them with the environment in which their work lies so that the barriers separating the administrators and the people rapidly crumble down.

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EMERGENCE OF NEW TRAINING NEEDS

In Rajasthan, a state in the northwestern part of India, administrators currently are engaged in a truly challenging development task. The challenge lies not in the size of the job alone which is indeed big enough and still growing, but also in the way it is to be managed to serve the poor.

A wide array of development programmes designed to improve the conditions of life and labour among the rural poor is now in operation. Some of these programmes are specifically meant to assist the small farmers, marginal farmers, landless labourers, and tribal groups by providing them credit facilities through nationalised banks, cooperative societies and by giving them all opportunities to use new varieties of seed, fertilisers, pesticides, tools and other inputs on their farms. Other programmes include provision of educational and medical facilities. Still others are concerned with the development of dairy farming, sheep farming, and local handicrafts.

To the situation arising from the commencement of these poverty–focused development programmes, the administrators initially responded by simply making some minor changes in the mode of selection of personnel for the new projects. 'Merit' as determined by the past performance of the officials chiefly emerged as the basis for selection. However it soon became evident that though these specially selected officials did a good job on the new projects, they lacked the 'expertise' needed to be effective in their new assignments.

It is now abundantly clear that the expanded development job cannot be handled by the workstyle of a previous era in which the functions of the government tended to be minimal – maintenance of order and collection of taxes were then among the only major concerns of the administration. Increasingly administrators are coming to realize that an innovative approach is needed to tackle the complex development problems facing the government. Several far-reaching changes in the manner of planning, organizing, implementing and monitoring the programmes must be absorbed in the administrative system and become a part of it, if development is really to proceed vigorously.

This need to prepare administrators for the development challenge has created rather heavy demands on the training institutions. Most development agencies now insist that their personnel – not only new recruits but also in-service – receives training before its assignment to the new projects. Quite clearly, knowledge, skills and attitudes needed for operating the programmes have to be consciously developed.

DEVELOPMENT SLANTED TRAINING

An institute where the new type of development training can be given has been operating in Rajasthan for two decades. Located in the state capital, Jaipur, the HCM State Institute of Public Administration (SIPA) was established in 1957 to train the state civil servants. Over the years, SIPA has grown to be a leading centre for public administration training and development studies.

Confronted with pressure to develop training programmes for the personnel engaged in rural development programmes, SIPA lately took steps to redesign its entire training activity. To begin with, a survey of training needs of the personnel in the major departments was conducted. This disclosed the need for development training in general as well as specific jobs for which training was urgently required. Training programmes in the area of development administration were then designed, and these presently occupy a dominant place in the activities of this institution.

A recent example of such a programme was a Training Seminar on Human Settlements Management sponsored by UNESCO and UNEP. Some other major programmes in the area of development administration conducted in the past three years and planned for the coming year are indicated below:

- Project planning, information, monitoring and control systems
- Small and marginal farmers' development programme
- Implementing development in tribal areas
- Implementation of land reform
- District planning
- Agricultural administration
- Administration of rural development
- Command area development
- Settlement programme in arid lands
- Drought-prone area programme
- Dairy development
- Credit planning and management
- Educational administration
- Administration of family planning programmes
- Human Settlements management
- Environmental challenges

Giving a development slant to training programmes at the SIPA has involved several special tasks. New curricula tailored to the specific, identified needs of the personnel engaged on various projects were first designed. Training materials including case studies reflecting problems being faced locally were then produced. Institution-based class-room teaching alone did not fully meet the needs of the project-oriented personnel and therefore field visits became part of the new training pedagogy. The Faculty had to be expanded to include disciplines relevant to the now emerging needs. Training for even the trainers had to be arranged within India as well as abroad to prepare them for their new responsibilities. Collaborative links with other institutions engaged in various kinds of development research and training were forged. In the research activity too a shift in focus became inevitable.

In most cases the demand for development training grew insistent so suddenly that the training programmes had to be developed at short notice. It surely would not have been fair to ask the development agencies to wait until ideal training programmes and materials had come into existence.

ORGANIZING EFFECTIVE TRAINING PROGRAMMES

Development training has come to stay. It is therefore important that close consideration is given to making training a lot more effective input in the development process than has been the case in the past.

Are there lessons from the SIPA experience which could help to design better training programmes to match the specific needs of the development agencies? Some observations based on this experience which trainers elsewhere might find useful can briefly be stated as follows.

One: as training resources usually are limited, the need for comprehensive planning for their optimum use is urgent. Pressures to develop 'quick–results' programmes often lead to poor preparation of personnel for the development task. Trainers must have sufficient time to develop training programmes.

Two: great care needs to be taken in designing the programmes, in spelling out the objectives and the means of attaining them. The goal of training should not only be to impart knowledge and skills to the administrators; it should also encourage them to work for and serve the poor. This requires a change in attitude, and because changes in attitude and behaviour cannot easily be brought about efforts in this direction need to be intensified.

Three: elements in the development training curricula should include a detailed analysis of the way in which development works particularly at the grassroots level, and also a study of the approaches to stimulate socio-economic change in tradition-bound cultures.

Four: as much as possible the training material should be produced locally. It is more germane to the specific needs of the personnel. Case studies can be written in advance by the participants themselves.

Five: training methods which ordinarily work well enough may not prove very effective in development training, for the in-service personnel training cannot be conducted in the same way as it is done for those newly recruited to the service. Seminars and workshops which are highly participative enabling everybody to profit from an interchange of experience are therefore preferable to mere lectures in the class room. Field visits should be arranged when necessary; the training should be essentially problem-oriented.

Six: it is not necessary to have wholly structured programmes. They could be flexible, capable of being modified to reflect the interests and requirements of the participations which often become better known as the programme progresses.

Seven: it is important that trainers have ample practical experience of field problems. They should always seek opportunities to visit projects and see things for themselves. Inefficient and poorly trained staff cannot be expected to do a first-rate training job. Special attention must be paid to the development of trainers. They are among the most scarce of the training resources.

Eight: participants themselves often make valuable contributions to the success of the programmes. Their involvement in the programmes must be enlisted from the very earliest stage. Even before the commencement of the programme they could be contacted to explain what they should do in advance to benefit the learning opportunity. Participants in training programmes must be chosen from different agencies and backgrounds. In the setting of a training institution they can discuss freely the problems of collaborative working which often bedevil the outcome of so

many projects. Here, they begin to see each other's viewpoint, and this can later help foster a team approach.

Nine: training cannot now be regarded as a 'once-and-for-all' affair. For the development personnel there must be several opportunities during their career for attending courses of longer or shorter duration.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The rapid growth in development training seems to be generating unrealistic expectations in some quarters. It is being assumed that once personnel has been trained development will proceed unhampered at a fast pace!

While the lack of trained manpower admittedly is a great hinderance to the successful execution of development programmes, and training by stimulating human resource development importantly contributes to the development process, it should be recognised that training has its limitations. Firstly, the training imparted in the recently established development training institutions may still not be as relevant as it should be. Development training has only now got going, and some time will elapse before it begins to make a measurable contribution to the outcome of planned development. Secondly, the success achieved by the trained personnel is in practice dependent on several factors which are often quite outside the orbit of training. A well-trained agricultural extension officer who is not able to get to the farmers supplies of seed or fertiliser in time, fails to perform his task efficiently not because of any inadequacy in his training, but because he lacks full organizational support. Thirdly, the deficiencies of the village level officials in performance, commitment and morale which can be attributed to the conditions of service that discourage the ablest from joining the rank of development workers, are sometimes sought to be corrected by training programmes. Perhaps the subsequent training effort cannot succeed in wholly remedying the deficiencies which result from the ill-founded personnel policies.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that training increasingly is coming to be included as an important component in the strategies being currently worked out to speed up development among the rural poor in Third World countries. And this surely is a hopeful trend. For the trainers it is thus all the more necessary that they get down to the job of designing meaningful training programmes to meet the needs of the new generation of administrators, all of whom now are in the thick of a fierce battle against poverty and underdevelopment

Budgetary Structures in Developing Countries

DAVID THOMPSON*

INTRODUCTION

Much work has been done on the economic problems of developing countries and the planning necessary to support development. This paper discusses one aspect of this planning – the budgetary structure suited to a developing country. Insofar as a developing country has different problems from an industrialised country, it seems likely that its budgetary structure, setting out the employment of a large part of the country's resources, and a still larger proportion of those specifically intended for development, should be specially designed for this purpose. In the instance, many developing countries have a budgetary structure basically similar to developed countries, and in some cases directly derived from a colonial past.

The method used in this paper was to examine two special questions – the usefulness of some variant of planning/programming systems, and the possibility of integration between the budgetary system and the national accounts system – against examples of existing practice. Existing practice consisted of 12 developing countries' budgets, the choice of which was dictated largely by availability. There is thus a considerable bias towards ex-British Colonies, rendering the study essentially preliminary, as practice in countries showing French, Spanish and other influences would no doubt be instructive.

Problems of definition arose at the outset. A 'budget' varies very considerably from one country to another, and these differences are indeed the basic material of the discussion. Nonetheless, a budget can be recognisably described, if not defined, as the annual proposals for government expenditure and income, agreed by the legislative body, and carried out by the executive. This paper is limited to the purpose and content of the main areas of the budget; other important parts of the public sector – regional and local authorities, and the problems of federalism, parastatals, trading boards and so on, are considered only incidentally, as are other major budgetary questions such as Parliamentary procedure, control of execution and audit.

It may be a fair generalisation to say that the legislature has sought to bind the executive via the budgetary process for three main reasons, which may be broadly

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classed as legal, managerial and economic. This, in operational terms, means that the legislature will require to be satisfied as to:

1 *Legal*: whether expenditure is made according to the instructions of the legislature. This involves accurate line description and executive machinery to keep expenditure within the described limits. It is a basic requirement of budget execution, and though one of the simplest, by no means easy to satisfy.

2 *Managerial*: whether the detailed requirements of the legislature are being fulfilled as economically as possible – i.e. resources management. The fulfilment of this objective and the preceeding one are to some extent opposed; the most accurate description may not ensure the most economic use of resources, where greater flexibility – at some risk of misspending and waste – may provide greater efficiency. Much of the argument on budget formats turns on this distinction.

3 *Economic*: – the macro-economic impact – i.e. whether the effect of the budget in regulating the economy, or in transforming it, answers requirements. This results from not only the overall expenditure in financial terms – the outcome of executive efficiency in (1) above – but in resource terms, which to some extent reflects (2); that is, efficient resource management which consumes resources freely available in the private sector rather than those in short supply. This leads to the full range of modern economic planning services, budgeting in real terms, full employment budgeting, and so on.

For the satisfaction of all these requirements, three main principles of budgetary exposition are to be considered: comprehensiveness, clarity and accuracy.

1 *Comprehensiveness*. The usefulness of a budget on all three counts, legal, managerial and economic, is vitiated if it does not include all public sector transactions. As well as conventional government expenditure all receipts from taxation, summaries of other transactions, such as trading activities, payments and receipts from para-statals and expenditure on statutory entitlements such as the judiciary should be included; as should income from non-tax services, such as loans and grants, and allocated sources of revenue as well as the corresponding expenditure. Budget summaries should include a complete overall balance in financial terms; while the economic implications of such summaries are much debated, they are a necessary starting point for discussion, and important in conveying the general impact of the budget.

2 *Clarity*. A budget is a highly technical document which must be as intelligible as possible to laymen. Compromises between unacceptably brief description and unmanageable length must be reached. The definitions most suited to legal requirements and managerial requirements will sometimes be irreconcilable; this point leads to the debate between input and output budgeting (the distinction is also referred to as subject – object, or linear and non-linear) which is discussed below. A simple example may be useful. It is easy to allocate funds precisely for one typist, one typewriter and other working requirements; it is not very difficult to decide on the right amount of the allocation. However, whether the typist's output is serving a useful micro-economic purpose, and ultimately the right macro-economic strategy, is much more difficult: and a good budget structure should give some kind of answer to these questions.

3 *Accuracy*. This has two related aspects: accuracy in estimating, and accuracy in controlling expenditure. There is no point in trying to control to the last penny an unrealistic set of estimates, and too low can be as bad as too high. Involuntary inaccuracies in estimating can be divided into three classes: insufficient detail in items; the wrong period for the estimating process (if too long, estimates will be out of date; if too short, ill prepared); and the time period of the estimates – any period over a year becomes progressively more precarious. Voluntary errors amount to padding by departments before scrutiny by the Treasury: this venerable sport will no doubt continue. A further requirement for accuracy is the correct formulation of expenditure authorities. Normally a subdivision of a budget is taken to constitute the expenditure authority, within the limits of which, both descriptive and financial, a departmental accounting officer – generally the permanent secretary – has authority to spend without restriction. To exceed this limit, he has to obtain either Treasury agreement to compensate the overspend by a saving elsewhere ('virement') or Ministerial authority for supplementary expenditure, either from a supplementary Estimate or contingency reserve. To combine the maximum operational flexibility with accurate control, these authorities have to be pitched at the right level: this will vary with conditions but is obviously important for accurate budgeting.

An obvious desideratum for a developing country is simplicity. This, however, in the case of developing countries, works both ways. A developing country will often be smaller and less sophisticated in organisational terms, than a developed country, which should argue for a simpler budget structure. On the other hand, the back-up facilities to Government – for example, outside research organisations, departments capable of handling long term capital spending, national accounting of the public sector – may be lacking, and will have to be done within the budget machinery.

THE LINK BETWEEN BUDGETS AND NATIONAL ACCOUNTING

It has been suggested that the budgetary process has three main purposes: legal, managerial and economic. The legal function of a budget, which is to ensure that the executive spends in accordance with the dictates of the legislature, has no direct relationship with national accounting, except insofar as both have an interest in accuracy. The second, which concerns the efficient use of resources, overlaps rather more. The third, involving national economic policy, coincides almost completely with the purposes of national accounting, both as regards macro-economic and micro-economic objectives of Government.

Thus, in any kind of national planning, flows to and from Government will be of major significance; indeed, in countries where statistical services are relatively undeveloped, details of public sector flows may be a large proportion of the information available. Flows to and from particular sectors will be of importance in assessing the effects of distributional policies. Price movements and availabilities of goods will have effects which it is necessary to assess in both public and private sectors.

Consistency between government and national accounts is therefore highly desirable; though not easy to achieve, for three reasons. First, because of the

diversity of purposes a common classification would have to encompass, there is a classification problem. Secondly, there is a formal problem. Matrices of government flows are becoming more commonplace in national accounting, but they are not adequate for government accounting; conversely the enormous detail published in government accounts, let alone the supporting details which are not published, are often not in a usable form for national accounts, and, while the detail is superabundant on expenditure, it may be lacking on revenue, which is generally accounted for, at least publicly, by broad categories of taxation. The combination of incomings – in rows – and outgoings – in columns, characteristic of a National Accounts matrix, thus does not exist in Government accounts in a comprehensive form, though small parts of it may have an identifiable input – output nature, because of trading activities or programme budget type classifications. Thirdly, there are a group of specific problems, where the private and public sectors treat similar phenomena differently; various aspects of the distinction between capital and current expenditure are among the most important.

Most large governments do not run separate capital budgets. The main reason for this is probably convenience; the essential control is the annual one, and departures in the direction of long-term spending are difficult to accommodate. Many large governments have commitment authorities or appropriations authorities which formalise the realities of a situation in which large amounts of expenditure are committed ineluctably over a period of years. The United States is the clearest example of this, with preparation, appropriation and execution cycles overlapping so that money is being spent from more than one budget at the same time. In France, similarly, part of the budget is already committed before the annual budget is voted. The United Kingdom, and the ex-dependencies who retain British practice in whole or in part, retain rigorous cash accounting, though the financing of long term projects is obviously a necessity. The difficulty has been overcome in the past by purely practical means; the Treasury accepts continuing commitments as arguments for another annual slice of cash. In recent years this process has been to some extent formalised in the PESC procedure, involving a 5 – year expenditure programme rolled over annually. In none of these cases, however, is the distinction between one-year and multi-year expenditure necessarily equivalent to the distinction between capital and current expenditure.

The distinction is, however, one of great utility in both economic and financial accounting, and there are arguments of some strength, though not universally accepted, for its usefulness in government accounting. Generally there seem to be good commonsense reasons why resources spent on current consumption should be separated from those spent to provide for future needs. Whatever definition is preferred – 'wealth used to produce future wealth' or 'expenditures which result in the acquisition of an asset', for example, there is obviously an important policy choice between these two types of expenditure. There are reasons in equity why expenditure intended to benefit the population over an extended period, should be paid for by taxpayers over a similar period; what Musgrave calls 'the mechanism of debt allocation among overlapping generations'. There are also good practical reasons. Financing major capital projects from taxes could well mean uncomfortable bumps in expenditure estimates, causing financing and possibly

macro-economic problems. This has been noted by economists as far back as Pigou. Estimating problems can also arise. Prediction processes tend to be different for the two types of spending, so in order to control flows accurately, the distinction must be feasible, otherwise estimation of current flows will become difficult as capital flows phase in and out.

In national accounting, the distinction is fundamental. The UN system uses Production, Consumption and Accumulation as its three basic subdivisions; Opening Assets and Closing Assets, though at the same level, are part of the Accumulation concept, and Rest of the World and Revaluations are relatively minor additions, with a partly technical function. In its treatment of the component parts of the capital definition – gross capital, depreciation, stock, non-reproducible tangible assets (e.g. land) – and of the institutional framework reflected in the subdivision Capital Finance, national accounting follows commercial practice much more than governmental, no doubt because both sides of the books are quantifiable.

Developing countries, unlike most developed countries – Sweden is an exception, – frequently run a capital budget, because governments have commitments to large scale economic changes, and major capital flows will be a necessary part of this. This also makes a convenient link with national planning, the capital budget being one year's slice of the public investment programme in the plan. The link with national accounting techniques is important here, and generally fairly easy.

Another problem is of a technical nature but of considerable dimensions if accurate comparisons between budgetary and national accounting figures are to be achieved; the basis on which figures are compiled – e.g., cash or accrual. Perhaps the majority of budgetary systems are on a cash basis, although many, such as France and the USA, run other systems – accrual, commitment etc – in parallel. The cash system presents fewer problems of definition than the others, but is not without its share. In this system the definition of a payment or receipt refers to movement of funds into, or out of, a Government fund or account, generally a form of Consolidated Fund. (A fresh series of problems arises when more than one fund is used). A payment is then the issue of a cheque or payment voucher from the Consolidated Fund, dated when it is issued, or alternatively – though unusually when it is received, banked and consequently debited to the Fund. Similarly, a receipt is generally when the sum is credited to the Fund – not when it is paid. A decision has to be taken on treatment of certain credit instruments, e.g. sight bonds and bonds with automatic accrual of interest; generally these are counted as a payment only when cashed. The origin of funds will need definition; which are public and which are private sector, and whether to count flows net or gross. As noted elsewhere, the government definition of 'public sector' is much wider than some national accounting definitions (e.g. in that nationalised industries and trading corporations are included).

National accounting generally functions on an accrual basis; receipts are recorded on accrual i.e. arrival of funds, expenditure on delivery of materials. The basic concept is the flow of goods, not money. Timing differences will arise between this

and a cash system. In commitment budgets, funds are recorded as spent when obligated – i.e. an order placed or a contract signed; it is held that the balance of government vis-a-vis the rest of the economy is more accurately reflected in this way, and there is indeed some analogy with a commercial balance which contains items for 'sundry debtors' and 'sundry creditors'. The statistical picture is likely to be less clear cut than a cash balance, even if conceptually better.

There is a further definitional problem, in that the individual item – i.e. the smallest subdivision employed – in national budgets often does not coincide with any national accounting item. In a national budget, items are sometimes statistically faulty; they are very largely administrative classifications, entrenched in routine, and show a good deal of overlap among themselves; for example, there may be labour costs, in items entitled 'departmental services', 'training and maintenance' as well as in the obvious place, 'personal emoluments'. In some systems, however, the categories are clearly defined, and homogeneous between Votes or Departments. In this case, a cross-walk between budget and national accounts can be established easily by means of a separate classification code common to both systems: a computerised link can then be established. This can be done with any budget, but if the items in the published documents are not clearly defined, much laborious work in scrutinising supporting accounts is necessary.

Lastly, there is a problem of structure. National accounts are now sometimes handled in the form of an overall matrix and sub-matrices, with inputs expressed in rows and outputs in columns. Each item in each matrix is the resultant of a submatrix, which ultimately breaks down into the smallest subdivision of each sector of the economy. The creation of such a system for government is a task for specialists, (in the form of a Social Accounting Matrix). Published budgets, where items build up into subheads, subheads into heads, heads into votes, votes into departments or ministries – with many variants – show no such beehive-like homogeneity. However, once items are made convertible, as described above, the crosswalk is not impeded by this structural difference. Reference to a standard national accounts system – for example, the UN System of National Accounts, table D1 page 157, and its component tables – will show that once the different terminologies are translated, the systems relate fairly easily.

PROGRAMME BUDGETING

The series of interlinked concepts covered by the phrase 'programme budgeting' are hard to define; several commonly used names overlap, or do not describe the same system. Current nomenclature includes 'programme budgeting' (PB), 'Planning and Programming Budgetary System' (PPBS), and the French counterpart Rationalisation of Budgetary Choices (Rationalisation des choix budgetaires, RCB). There are conceptual links with management by objectives (MBO) systems analysis, and so on.

There is a recognisable degree of homogeneity among those ideas, now current for some years, and traceable well back into the last century. Two quotations, sixty years apart, will illustrate the continuity of ideas. In 1912, the Taft Commission reported 'In order that he (the administrator) may think intelligently about the

subject of his responsibility he must have before him regularly statements which will reflect results in terms of quality and quantity by units of cost and units of efficiency'; and from a French PCB symposium, 'It is not possible to make someone really responsible for a result which has been fixed without his agreement'. Another enlightening remark also comes from French sources: RCB, says M. Debré, is a state of mind, not a method. Similarly, American writers are at pains to emphasise that PPBS is not a magic formula or a black box that signals the right answer. Two principal characteristics can nonetheless be identified without risk of cavil. First, PB emphasises output control, in contradiction to traditional methods based on input control. (This distinction is sometimes phrased as 'object' versus 'subject' classification). Secondly, it opens up the time scale. Little programming is possible within a strict annual budget. Governments have, however, long dealt with multi-year spending within successive annual frameworks, and in practice the problem becomes largely an organisational one – how to press the trigger for the annual snapshot at the right moment. It is a problem analogous, though not necessarily identical, to that of distinguishing capital and current payments.

Programme budgeting was used extensively, though experimentally , in the US government from 1965 onwards; though it is now out of favour, the analytic techniques survive. In Britain, it has been used in some government departments and (as also in the USA) in a number of local authorities. In France, RCB has been adopted systematically, and a full scale system now runs in parallel with the existing budgetary machinery. There are as many versions of PB as there are governments using it, and the developing countries are no exception. It has been fairly widely introduced in South America, largely through the advocacy of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). There are examples of programme budgets, of a simple kind, in Lesotho, Grenada and Dominica; the Phillipines, under US incluence, have devoted considerable efforts to the system. While, France apart, the idea has rather fallen from favour in developed countries, it seems that a fairly simple form of PB is proving useful in some LDCs. Where a decrepit ex-colonial system is falling into disuse, any change – particularly one which, merely by the formation of programmes and some crude quantification of output, turns official minds onto objectives rather than costs – may be beneficial. Wildowsky quotes a Peruvian official'..... a lot of people profited unfairly from the confusion of the old system. When we introduced the brand-new program budget, it was a lot easier to skim away antiquated practices on the assumption that they didn't fit into the new system.'

The method of PB rests typically on a procedure of up to five phases, with a continuing feedback between each. The phases are described in the RCB system, which is as highly organised as any, as follows:

1 Inventory of the situation.
2 Research, clarification and classification of objectives and means of action.
3 Setting up and evaluating programmes.
4 Deciding on programmes.
5 Administration and execution of programmes, testing of results.

Another description, in terms of budgetary procedure, starts after phase (3) and considers

(3)a insertion of programme in the budgetary structure

(3)b budgetary discussion in terms of programmes (i.e. how far programmes can be included within the funds available) – which leads to (4) above.

Chronologically, stages (1) to (3) may take several years of planning; 3(a) and 3(b) take place during the annual estimating process. (4) is part of the budget decision and (5) the annual slices of the programme in successive budgets. There is continual feedback at all stages. While stages 1 and 2 draw on the background knowledge of departments or outside research, stage 3 uses the operational techniques such as cost benefit analysis which are associated with programme budgeting.

Control of output as well as input is, as noted above, basic to PB, with feedback of estimated output figures occurring at all stages. This feedback process begins with the statement of objectives which is often part of a programme set out in budgetary documents – e.g. for Forestry and Timber, 'to provide management of the nation's forests'. In the case of a programme such as Agricultural Extension the description may be quite detailed, e.g.

'1 To provide a specialist and general advisory service to support the efforts of farmers, in particular small farmers, in order to stimulate the agricultural economy and the agricultural life of the State.

2 To maintain close relations, by providing regular opportunities for exchange of views and information, with associations of farmers and progressive individual farmers in the State.

3 To promote programmes for the expansion of production in the field of crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry.' (Grenada)

In programmes where output is marketed, financial targets may be given. A forestry programme, for example, may be split up into conservation and planning, and exploitation; the first may have an output of timber which is marketable, and in fact sold to the second as input, the second then processes the timber and sells it commercially, thereby showing a financial output which represents with fair accuracy the economic and social output. The financial output of the first sub-programme will not be its full output, which would include the less quantifiable benefits of well-run forests, including climatic and amenity advantages, as well as longer run commercial benefits. Programmes which show financial benefits as the whole, or nearly the whole, of their output are likely to be rare, because such sectors should be separated out into trading organisations with a full commercial accounting system; the ultimate development being a nationalised industry with a statutorily imposed requirement of profitability, providing full accounting on basically commercial principles.

Outputs can often be expressed in quantified but not financial terms. The methodology of this is elaborate, and the link with social cost benefit analysis is evident, though these techniques are generally concerned with converting social benefits into money figures for comparing different projects. However, simple

quantification is often possible and useful; the number of plants produced by government propagation centres (probably sold at a sub-market price); hospital bed-days per annum; number of calls made by advisers on agricultural extension programmes; traffic flows – etc. All these can provide valid indications of output, particularly in comparing one year with another, one unit with another, or public sector units with similar ones in the private sector. When two programmes have comparable outputs (perhaps expressible in money terms) comparisons of relative efficiency can then readily be made; but even when the outputs are disparate some element of comparison can be established if inputs can be accurately estimated. Thus, it is difficult to compare the value of an increase in, say, hospital beds, with an increase in the number of school leavers with O levels; but if it can be said that an increase in expenditure of X will bring about an increase in output of Y in one case, and 2Y in the other, this may well help government's decision.

EXISTING PRACTICE

As mentioned above, the sample of budgets examined – though a considerable mass of material – was small and atypical. All came from countries formerly British Colonies or within the British sphere of influence. Two of them (Malaysia and Pakistan) are large, with current budgets of the order of $4 billion US; Kenya approaches $1 billion. The rest are small, up to $360 million; four (in descending order, Botswana, Grenada, Antigua and Dominica) are $50 million or less. The level of economic prosperity is varied, from Pakistan at about $250 US per capita to Cyprus at about $2,500. All the twelve have cash budgets, and all but Pakistan show a recognisable descent from a British colonial budget model of 1890. All have capital budgets (only dimly foreshadowed in 1890) which generally contain both ordinary government capital expenditure (e.g. furniture, machinery and vehicles) and development projects. The Vote structure, both in the number and title of Votes, Ministries, Heads or whatever name is used, and in the internal structure of the Votes, shows considerable similarity, though many different, and sometimes complex, systems of numerotation are used. A National Plan, which at least gives the impression that development is going to take place, is an essential part of Government strategy in many developing countries. In the present sample only four countries have produced or are about to produce a Plan (though the documentation is not up to date) ; in others developmental thinking and budgetary planning are, nonetheless, obviously well integrated (e.g. Cyprus).

The countries considered, nonetheless, show features which may be typical of developing countries:

– the commitment of government to take drastic economic action to raise living standards, probably by increased exploitation of existing resources or by transformation – e.g. industrialisation
– a tradition of government intervention, perhaps arising from an autocratic past, a paternalistic tradition, and a relatively unskilled and politically illiterate electorate
– the corresponding situation in the private sector: possibly, undeveloped capital markets, little productive flexibility, etc.
– a different pattern of current government spending: defence will often be very low, little more than police, and social services may be undeveloped; on the other

hand, government employment will be even more important as an economic and political factor than in developed economies
– large intakes of capital, as grants and loans
– a small and relatively unsophisticated administration, which may nevertheless be the only qualified body in the country: there will often be a dearth of university research institutes, national accounting bodies and tax records to fall back on. This argues, paradoxically, in the directions of both simplicity and completeness.

In terms of budgetary policies this situation will emphasise economic considerations, and to a lesser degree managerial, rather than legal. Precise control of government spending is, as always, a primordial requirement, on the satisfaction of which the whole development programme, among other things, will depend; but this may be less obvious because the legislature may be less active and less well informed than in developed countries and financial control will be in practice an executive rather than a legislative responsibility.

Among the samples, the documentation only provides two examples, both small, of full-blown programme budgeting (Grenada and Dominica); Grenada introduced the new system only in 1978, and little information is available as to how successful Dominica's rather longer-standing reorganisation has proved. Malaysia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea have also introduced programme budgeting to varying extents; a study of their experience, and those of the South American countries who have been running the system for some while, would be rewarding. It seems likely that the change was often made partly in order to get rid of defects in the old system – out of date or clumsy categorisation, parastatals ursurping large areas of Government control, and so on – rather than because of the self evident merits of the new.

CONCLUSION

Current budgetary practice in developing countries shows the following trends:

– Emphasis on capital spending and income. This leads to a separate capital budget comprising the detail of development projects and identifying the financing, by loans and growth. Typically – or ideally – the current budget will show a small surplus which will be used to finance the deficit on the capital budget.
– Emphasis on long term considerations. The capital budget should link up with a development strategy set out in a National Plan.
– Emphasis on objectives in current spending. Much current spending, as well as the capital budget, will be orientated towards development, rather than the efficient operation of an existing machine. Development requirements will engender a need to think in resource rather than financial terms, and the capacity to relate budgetary flows with national accounts flows, for purposes of macro-economic planning.
– A proliferation of para-statals, trading boards, etc., not only to supplement the deficiencies of the private sector and to assist in the development process, but to handle single-crop economies or sectors of the economy.

As regards the link with national accounting, if macro-economic planning is going to take place in any but the most simple way, some form of national accounting is

necessary, and the substantial part of any economy which is public sector must be taken account of.

Planning sophisticated to this extent may well be practicable in a relatively small country; Botswana, for example, with a current budget of about $50 million US and GDP some four times as big, has an extensive national accounting and planning system. It is not necessary, nor indeed generally practicable, for budget categories and nomenclature to be the same as national accounting terminology, and most budgetary systems, if sufficient skilled manpower is deployed, can be translated into national accounting terms. A meticulously detailed and almost completely unorganised budget (such as United Kingdom Estimates before 1914) where almost everything is written down accurately in a separate category, is good raw material for national accounting; what is troublesome is a system which is not consistent e.g. where Personnel in one Vote contains all personnel costs and in another, part of them are under Maintenance or Communications. National accounting data can be extracted from the accounts supporting the Estimates, but at the cost of much work (as for example in the Malaysia Functional Plan). Smooth and economical administration will however be facilitated if categories are consistent, clear cut and common as far as possible to all Votes. A numerical system of cross-references can then readily be established to national accounts.

As regards output budgeting, it has been emphasised this is an approach rather than a formula, and that there are as many different applications as there are users. Some form of output accounting may be useful for developing countries who are likely to be more interested in fundamental economic change than developed countries and whose governmental resources are less likely to be able to provide sophisticated internal checking of government efficiency. They are also more likely, because of a more powerful executive and an administrative machine unburdened by the momentum (or inertia) of centuries, to take the radical measures of administrative reform that may be required; they escape the conditions which have killed thorough-going output budgeting in the USA. One technical feature which is useful for ouptut budgeting – the establishment of common categories, running horizontally across all Votes – has already been identified as useful on other grounds. For output budgeting it will permit comparisons to be made with input factors across the board.

In summary, the evidence surveyed may lead to the following conclusions:

– developing countries require different budgetary structures from developed countries, particularly because of the importance of a long term development planning and related annual slices in a capital budget
– developing countries have been modifying budgetary structures fairly quickly in this direction. There are, however, considerable traces of earlier structures, recognisable relics of a colonial past, in the shape of inconsistent or over-complicated classifications
– a useful modification might be to establish common categories across all Votes, compatible with national accounting systems, probably based on the UN model. Some form of output budgeting could also be useful.

Note: this paper is a summary of a fuller paper, giving details of the budgets examined and of the national accounting and programme budgeting techniques, and setting out a model budget structure for an imaginary developing country. Copies of this paper may be obtained from overseas Development Administration, Eland House, Stag Place, London SW1

The National Seed Project in India

SATYA DEVA*

The National Seed Project was started in India with World Bank aid in the summer of 1976 to support development of India's seed industry. This is a case study of the Project in Haryana, one of the four States where it is being implemented, with special reference to the production and utilization of certified wheat seed. Data were collected by means of interviews in the field with farmers, seed dealers, officials and politicians; observation of officials' and farmers' meetings; and the study of official correspondence, records, reports and research findings. The narrative and commentary were read in draft by Haryana officials whose views were taken into account when the study was revised.

BACKGROUND

The Government of India (GOI) established the National Seeds Corporation (NSC) in 1963 (under the Companies Act, 1956). NSC developed the production of high yielding varieties of seeds through contracts with progressive growers, scientific processing, certification and marketing. The National Commission on Agriculture later noted that its blue tag had within a short while, become a 'hallmark of quality'.[1]

The study team on agricultural administration of the Administrative Reforms Commission, however, received 'complaints' regarding its operations (1967).[2] These bodies, as well as the Seed Review Team (1968)[3] and the All-India Seminar on Seed Certification (1970)[4] were agreed on the need to have a separate agency for certification; the combination of this function with that of production or marketing, as in NSC, was in their view not 'permissable'. The Seeds Act of 1966 had already provided for quality control by requiring certification of notified varieties of seeds offered for sale. Under it, each State, as well as the Central Government, could establish a seed laboratory and a seed certification agency. The Seeds Rules (1968),

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[1]Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture, National Commission on Agriculture, *Interim Report on Multiplication and Distribution of Quality Seed pertaining to High Yielding Varieties and Hybrids of Cereals* (New Delhi: Manager of Government of India Press, November, 1971), p.6.

[2]Government of India, Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Agricultural Administration* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, September 1967), Vol. I, p.156.

[3]Government of India, Seed Review Team, *Report* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1968), p.101.

[4]Government of India, National Commission on Agriculture, *op. cit.*, p.32.

framed under the Act, provided that the certification agency, in addition to inspecting fields and granting certificates, shall 'carry out educational programmes designed to promote the use of certified seed....'

The National Commission on Agriculture reported in 1971 that the quality of high yielding varieties of seeds was 'deteriorating rapidly' and that these were often found mixed with 'a lot of off-types',[1] and again in 1976 that, 'It is a general complaint that quality seed of high yielding varieties is in short supply for the major cereals and not available at all for many of the other crops.'[2]

In Haryana, the Haryana Seeds Development Corporation (HSDC), a public limited company (under the Companies Act, 1956), was set up in 1974. Haryana was one of the chief seed producing States and it was hoped that large profits could be made by producing more seed and selling it in other States. However, HSDC had to face stiff competition with NSC and the Tarai Development Corporation of Uttar Pradesh State, and suffered big losses during the first two years of its operation.

FORMULATION

The GOI set up in February 1975 a joint working party consisting of nineteen Indian and two World Bank specialist officials. It was asked to formulate policy to meet the growing demand of seed, design an organizational and institutional structure, and formulate an all—India project. The resulting five year proposal (1976–81), after pruning, was to cost Rs. 461 M (U.S. $52.7 M), of which U.S. $11.1 M would be foreign exchange. The World Bank considered it suitable for a loan of U.S. $25 M with a maturity of 30 years, for covering, net of duties and taxes, 100% of foreign exchange and 34% of local costs. The loan would provide for imported laboratory equipment and machinery for farming and processing of seed.

The policy underlying the Project was to support the expansion of the private sector to maintain a reasonable balance between the public and private sectors and hence the spur of competition. Inclusion of the private sector in the project was intended to help safeguard it from the discrimination, which it was believed, it had suffered at the hands of earlier Governments.

It was proposed that each State would have a seed corporation. Farmers who would grow the seed would own shares in the corporations; the State Governments and NSC would also provide share capital. The corporations would be run on commercial lines, with an estimated return of 30% after tax (50% before tax) on fixed investment. The estimated economic rate of return for the Project, calculated over a period of 13 years, was 65%. The Project proposal contained detailed financial and economic analyses. However, some of the basic data, such as those of

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[1] *Ibid.*, p.3.

[2] Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, *Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, Part X, Inputs* (mimeographed, 1976), p.8.

seed demand, were inadequate. A PERT chart was prepared for the Project as a whole, but implementation schedules for separate agencies in Haryana had not been prepared till February 1978.

Under the Project breeder seed was to be produced by agricultural universities, and its progeny foundation seed, by NSC. The State corporation would buy foundation seed from NSC and sell it to seed growers. The seed crop would be inspected in the field by officials of the independent certification agency. If found adequate, it would be processed in the plants, tested in the independent State laboratory, and finally 'certified' by the certification agency. The corporation would now pay the grower for the seed and arrange to sell it.

NSC was to play a coordinating role. It would have representation on the Board of Directors of each State corporation, and vice versa. It would be the channel for World Bank aid. It would set up processing plants for State corporations and provide training to their personnel. It would largely handle inter-State trade in seed although State corporations would also be free to undertake it.

In Haryana, the targets for the production of certified wheat seed for the five years from 1976–77 to 1980–81 respectively were 13,500, 17,000, 22,000, 26,000 and 29,000 (metric) tons. The only other seeds to be produced were Paddy and cotton. The targets for these for 1980–81 were 3,000 tons each. Two new processing plants were to be set up and some canals were to be remodelled. The estimated five year cost of the Project in Haryana was Rs. 45.37 M.

IMPLEMENTATION

The Governments of India and Haryana were concerned that World Bank aid should be availed of and the Project started as soon as possible. Hence there was no time to prepare for the Project. No demand survey could be made; training in seed production could not be given to personnel; needed facilities for processing (such as drying) could not be provided; and proper storage for seed could not be arranged. It was hoped that these activities could go on during the implementation of the Project. For the time being substitute arrangements were to be made.

Organization and Personnel

The memorandum and articles of association of HSDC were amended in April 1976 to provide for participation by shareholder growers, NSC, and the Government of Haryana (GOH) in the proportion 35: 30: 35 in a total authorised capital of Rs. 50 M. The contribution of GOH was to include that of the Haryana Agricultural University. This arrangement became part of an agreement signed by GOI, GOH, NSC and HSDC in October 1976. HSDC had twelve senior officers and 113 other established staff members out of whom ten were on secondment from NSC or GOH. In all forty, or about one third, were graduates in agriculture. However only 10 had higher qualifications or had attended NSC's fifty-two day training course in seed production. The others could be expected to have only rudimentary knowledge in this area. None of the officers was a trained manager; only one had attended a short term course in marketing.

The Haryana Seed Certification Agency was set up and registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1960, in April 1976. It was expected to be self-supporting by means of fees obtained from seed growers; however actually it ran into large deficits. All four of its specialist officers at the headquarters and eleven out of fifteen in the field were graduates in agriculture on deputation from the Department of Agriculture, GOH; only one of them had received NSC's training in seed production.

Seed Growers

The Project area consisted of nine Blocks, of about 100 villages each, divided into three zones around the three existing processing plants. The area was selected on the basis of productivity of major crops, availability of well-irrigation and compactness for seed production. Under an agreement, farmers in the area would buy two shares of Rs.100 each per acre of seed producing land; the share money would be paid over five crops. HSDC would buy their produce if it fulfilled certification standards at a pre-determined price; they would not sell it to any one else unless it was found to be sub-standard.

By the end of February 1978 there were 285 shareholder seed growers. About one third of these were growing seed in plots of five acres each; another one third in plots of 5-10 acres; the remaining ones used larger plots ranging between 10 and 100 acres. Seed was being grown generally only in parts of their larger lands.

Seed growers were given an opportunity to ventilate their problems in annual conventions organized by HSDC. Top officials were present and participated in the discussion. The growers maintained that they had to bear too many risks for their small margin of profit, making the programme unattractive to them. Foundation seed was costly at Rs.350 per quintal (qtl), and still sometimes suffered from physical and genetic impurity and defective germination. This had occasionally been accepted by the suppliers, NSC, who attributed it partly to defective breeder seed. HSDC had found weevil infestation ranging from 3 to 15% in some of the foundation seed. However, the sufferer in the end was the seed grower if his produce did not come up to certification standards. He had also to pay Rs.25 as registration charges, Rs.20 per acre as the inspection fee and Rs.10 as testing fee to the certification agency. He had to incur additional costs on cultivation of seed, such as for roguing and isolation, and a greater use of fertilizers and pesticides. There was no crop insurance; yet, for example, the seed crop was damaged by rain in the spring of 1977. Processing and testing of seed took several months; there were losses due to evaporation, rigorous cleaning, and rejection of part of the crop after grading. Payments were often delayed, although efforts were being made to avoid delays through delegation of authority to plant managers. If after waiting for months the seed was finally rejected, there were additional losses due to processing charges (Rs.12 per qtl), low prices in a saturated market and costs of return transport. Growers maintained that in view of all these risks the price of Rs.145 per qtl paid to them (as against Rs.110 for ordinary grain) was not sufficiently remunerative. They, however, often agreed to participate under pressure from HSDC officials who dumped foundation seed on them at their own risk without receiving immediate cash payment.

Growers complained that despite the payment of fees, the benefit of expert advice was not available to them. A seed production assistant of HSDC was expected to cover 1,000 acres; an inspector of the Department of Agriculture, 15 to 20 villages. Most of them had neither the time nor the training to help growers.

Growers also complained of corrupt practices. There was a widespread belief that a defective seed crop could be got certified as good, and vice versa. High officials testified that they had received reports; five appeals were pending with them. Defective quality control was one of the recognised reasons for bad foundation seed also. The seed certification agency had not been able to inspire confidence; it had also not carried out the educational function provided for under its rules.

On the other hand, officials of the certification agency maintained that growers who failed to achieve requisite standards often blamed them for corruption. They also mentioned that in time of scarcity of seed, some growers themselves offered inducements to them to get their good seed rejected so as to be free from the agreement with HSDC, and then sell to willing buyers at a higher price.

Processing

Under the Project, the three processing plants, (one in each zone) belonging to NSC were transferred, as part of its equity contribution, to HSDC. Their total capacity was 14,000 tons. Two more plants were to be set up to provide for an additional capacity of 15,000 tons. An indent for one set of cleaners and graders costing Rs.0.3 M was to be forwarded to the World Bank by NSC. However, there was a question whether an import licence was needed; later one was issued. This resulted in delay; no new equipment had been received till February 1978. There was no drier at one of the plants; it was out of order at another; paddy seed had to be dried in the sun and could get wet if it rained. Planning of plant investments and production, and feedback from plants to headquarters needed improvement.

There were no trained managers at the plants. Work norms had either not been determined or were not followed; labour laws either not fully understood or not accepted. Workers had grievances that conditions of service in plants were inferior to those in offices. There was no proper inventory control, leading to delays in obtaining materials for treatment and packing. The processing cost was found to be high and efforts were being made to reduce it.

It was envisaged that the Central Warehousing Corporation would provide the storage space. However, there were problems of coordination between it and the HSDC. Thus working hours of the two were not the same, putting officials and seed growers to difficulty. There was not enough storage space either, with the result that some of the precious seed had to be stored in private sub-standard stores. There were complaints of weevil infestation in certified seed.

Marketing

Inter-State marketing had been entrusted mainly to NSC. There were no demand data at the inception of the Project. A demand survey made during the first year was not wholly satisfactory as it did not take price elasticity and projected production

programmes fully into account. NSC bought 4,660 tons in 1976–77 and 3,053 tons in 1977–78 from HSDC. However it could not honour all its indents, as in the case of HSDC's paddy seed in 1977. HSDC therefore demanded in early 1978 that in future NSC should pay an advance of 10%, even as it obtained a 25% advance for foundation seed supplied by it. There was friction between NSC and HSDC. NSC had no chairman for about a year and decision-making at the top was slow.

Marketing within Haryana was done through two channels which acted as checks on each other: 120 private dealers chosen by HSDC, and the Haryana State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Limited, already existing under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961. The dealers got a commission of 8% and the Federation 10%. The Federation arranged its sales through its constituents, 2,138 agricultural credit and service cooperative societies, nicknamed 'mini banks'. The Federation's commission amounted to Rs.23 per qtl., of which it retained Rs.18 and gave only Rs.5 to the mini bank. This left no margin for any incentives to the salesman. Farmers complained of inattentive salesmen. Mini banks lacked storage space and could keep no stocks.

The post of marketing manager in HSDC had not been filled. Market research and promotion of certified seed needed special attention. Communication between field officials of HSDC and the Federation was faulty; within the Federation itself communication and control were faulty: distribution in areas away from the plants was not to the satisfaction of the farmer.

RESULTS

For 1976–77 the target for wheat seed production in the Project area was 13,500 tons. As against this, 8,285 tons were produced, about half of it inside the Project area and the other half outside it. The grower was paid Rs.145 per qtl. After processing, the landed cost came to Rs.185. The dealer's commission was Rs.16. About Rs.17 were spent on transportation, sales tax and market fee. HSDC's overheads and profits amounted to Rs.9. The total cost thus came to Rs.227 per qtl.

Haryana farmers were generally unwilling to buy certified seed since its price was about 31% higher than their home grown seed. The Department of Agriculture, GOH, recommended that since certified seed could give a 10% higher yield, its sale within Haryana should be promoted by subsidising it. However, if its price were lowered to that of ordinary grain it was likely to be used for consumption. Hence it was decided that the subsidised price of certified seed should be about 15–20% higher than that of ordinary grain. The subsidy could gradually be phased out. One result of the introduction of the subsidy was that some of the private dealers who were entrusted with the sale of subsidised seed within Haryana, sold it surreptitiously outside the State at high profits, thus depriving the Haryana farmer of its benefit.

During 1976–77 GOH gave a subsidy of Rs.100 per quintal; 2,890 tons were sold to farmers in Haryana at a price of Rs.150 per quintal. During 1977–78 the subsidy was reduced to Rs.52 and the price went up to Rs.175. At this higher price, 5,075 qtls were sold. There were long queues of buyers and many returned disappointed.

This showed that the demand had increased greatly. The goal of making certified seed acceptable to farmers at the unsubsidised market price was thus nearer fulfilment.

For 1977–78 the original target of production was 17,000 tons. This was revised to 16,000 tons in 1977. The total estimated production, in and outside the Project area, after sowing had been done, however, was 11,000 tons.

There were three main reasons for the shortfall in production: (1) damage by rain and floods, (2) lack of firm indents by NSC and (3) problems of growers. One of their grievances, in addition to those mentioned above, was that no dividends were declared although HSDC had made a profit of Rs.0.78 M in 1976–77 on a paid up capital of Rs.4.1 M. This was because it had suffered losses worth Rs.1.69 M during the two previous years. HSDC's shares were apparently not very attractive; up to the end of February 1978 shares for about half a million rupees had been bought which was about one tenth of the GOH contribution. About 20 of the share-holders were trying to wriggle out of their agreements and had fallen in arrears of their share instalments.

Utilization

A random sample survey of farmers made in the Radaur Block of the Project area in October 1977 by the Economic and Statistical Organization, GOH, brought out some interesting facts. The respondents were 60 users and 73 non-users of certified wheat seed. It was found that users came only from among land owners and high caste farmers; not even one came from among tenants or low (scheduled) caste ones. Landholding sizes were almost evenly distributed between 5 acres and 20. With the use of certified seed, yield had increased from 11.5 to 12.4 qtl per acre. Most of the users lacked knowledge: 42 (70%) did not know about requisite doses of irrigation, 36 (60%) of fertilizers; and 59, or almost all, of pesticides. Among the non-users 26 (36%) did not know about certified seed; 22 (30%) did not think that it was better than their home grown seed; 15 (20%) said that they had obtained seed from fellow cultivators; and 10 (14%) mentioned difficulties such as those of irrigation and high price.

CONCLUSION

This is a story of agricultural development through the application of new scientific knowledge. The public sector was being used to develop the private seed industry. The production and distribution of certified seed was increasing while governmental subsidy was decreasing. The World Bank was helping through technical assistance in designing and reviewing the project, and by providing equipment and machinery under a long term loan.

The case brings to light some problems also. One of these concerns the education of farmers most of whom lacked knowledge of the new varieties and the best techniques to use; officials also often lacked the training to be able to help them. More education to growers could give more flawless seed crops, thus reducing the scope of corruption also.

It is interesting to note that HSDC officials, who had a stake in the production programme were taking personal risks, while certification officials who perceived their role as a negative one, were being accused of corrupt practices. The quality of human material, education and training in the two agencies was by and large the same. The difference in their behaviour highlights the significance of institutional factors.

The seed grower, who was the kingpin of the programme, faced too many risks. HSDC *could* take care of some of these; it could provide crop insurance. It could provide some services requiring large investments, such as the spraying of pesticides. It could also test the seed in its own laboratories and buy it straightaway (at a somewhat lower rate) instead of making the grower wait for months. The risk of rejection at the time of certification would still be there; however HSDC was a business undertaking and could bear some risk.

Management had not been recognised as an input in the undertaking: there was no manager trained in modern methods and techniques of management. If this were any indication of the general condition of the public sector in India, a change in attitudes at high levels, as well as more training, would seem to be needed.

Certified seed was not being used by tenant or low caste farmers. The benefit of new scientific knowledge had not reached the poor and the lowly, who needed it most.

Public and Quasi-Public Sponsored Housing in Nigeria: An Appraisal

D. C. I. OKPALA*

INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian Governments have shown concern for the urban housing problem in recent years and have made policy efforts at ameliorating the situation. These concerns are evident from the several measures, including increasing allocation of funds for housing production in the successive National Development Plans. In the first Plan (1962–68)[1] for example, the government proposed to build 24,000 housing units,[2] but this was only in Lagos, the Federal Capital. In the second Plan (1970–74), an allocation of ₦2.6[3] million was made for the housing sector and great emphasis was placed on the expansion of credit facilities for housing construction, and the importation of building materials was liberalised. The Third National Development Plan (1975–80) initially allocated ₦1.837 billion for housing by all governments. The dominant project in this subsector was the Federal Government's housing programme which involved direct construction of low rental dwelling units of about 60,000 units at various locations in the country. The allocation to housing in this Plan was later revised upwards to ₦2.256 billion and the number of housing units to be directly built by the government also revised upwards from the original 60,000 to 200,000 units.

While these governments intentions and policy efforts in recent years have been impressive, the approach, however, has seemed to be faulty. The result is that, in spite of the best of intentions, government's efforts had had minimal impact on the housing problem. This faulty approach is the government's involvement in direct housing construction.

Principally (though may not be wholly) as a result of this approach government produced housing in Nigeria has tended to be characterised by five major features, namely:

1 restricted accessibility and concentration of publicly controlled housing on a few beneficiaries;
2 high cost – which intensifies the restriction in accessibility;

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[1]Federation of Nigeria: National Development Plan 1962–68.
[2]A housing unit is defined by the Plan as one accommodating six people.
[3]Approx 78 Naira = £1.

3 inordinately high standard of construction and land wasteful forms of housing development;
4 commercial orientation;
5 and consequently upon 1–4 above, the absence of or minimal impact on the objective problem – which is the provision of housing to a substantial proportion of the segment of the population that need assisted housing ie the bulk of the low and moderate income group of people.

These features manifest themselves in the operations and products of almost all public agencies charged with publicly sponsored housing in Nigerian cities. The following paragraphs contain a review of the experiences and performances of some of these public housing agencies.

REVIEW OF SOME CASES

The Western Nigeria Housing Corporation: since its establishment in 1958 it has built only bungalow type houses or duplexes and no rental apartments or rooming houses. It argues that bungalows are easier and faster to maintain and easy to sell. There are no problems with maintenance of blocks of flats and greater problems selling blocks of flats. The guiding criteria is profitability and ease of marketing.[1]

Besides, prices of the corporation's houses are not based on the costs of development and construction of such houses, but rather on their market value. The cost of construction may be below the market value, at which the sale price is fixed, a price which is determined by demand, supply and other 'externalities'. Theoretically this pricing principle implies that if the cost of development and construction is above the prevailing market value (which it rarely is) the house has to be sold at the market value all the same. This implies of course, that there is virtually no difference between its pricing principles and that of the private housing market. In fact, for comparable quality the housing might be cheaper in the private housing market.

This is the state of affairs, albeit these agencies and corporations acquired the lands on which to build by way of the Compulsory Acquisition Law, and most of the people from whom these lands are acquired are poor and who cannot afford access thereto after they are acquired.

The Anambra State Housing Development Authority (SHDA)

The Anambra State Housing Development Authority provides an example of both the high cost of publicly built or sponsored housing in Nigeria and the inequities in the distribution of completed housing. All the features in the faulty approach already outlined are found to apply – restricted accessibility, high cost, commercial orientation, etc. The Anambra SHDA also introduces a new dimension in the issue by requiring of purchasers of its houses to make full and complete down payments for the houses they desire before the Authority actually starts construction of such houses.

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[1]Interview with Estate Officers of the Corporation.

The State Government uses its compulsory acquisition powers to obtain land for the SHDA. The Authority then develops these lands and sells or rents the houses to the public on a commercial basis. As with other similar agencies in the country, most of its developments are single family bungalows or duplexes which are in almost all cases, too expensive for the reach of people with middle-level incomes, much less the poor. The way of financing the purchase of its houses too, makes it all the more inaccessible to the ordinary people. Full payments for a house must be made before the Authority commences the construction of the house. It requires applicants for purchase of its houses to 'remit, within six weeks from the date of its advertisement, the appropriate sum attached to the type of house of the applicant's choice, and building will start as soon as your money is received'.[1] Besides, the Authority can arbitrarily increase the purchase price of a house while construction is under way or after completion of construction and require the buyer to meet these increases (which are sometimes more than doubled) or lose the house. The Authority's policy is to construct and sell its houses on an outright cash basis.[2]

These points are best illustrated by the case of some twenty-seven Central Bank of Nigeria workers who got loans from their employers to buy the Authority's houses. More than one year after making full payments for the houses, they still remained incomplete and some had not even been started. This was in spite of the Authority's initial guarantee that 'the houses will be completed not later than 7 months from the date of payment'.[2] In addition to non-fulfilment of its guarantees, the SHDA increased the prices of the houses by amounts varying from 57% to 153% on grounds of scarcity of building materials and consequent rise in the prices, arguing only that the 'circumstances leading to the change in prices are regretted but are quite beyond our control'.[3] By this increase, prices per square feet of floor space averaged ₦20.1 which was very high for the city at the time. Those who could not pay up at the new prices lost the houses. As the victims pointed out in their petition to the State Military Governor 'The new prices of the houses are so high that none of us would qualify to receive such advances from our employers under the Central Bank of Nigeria Staff Housing Loan Scheme'.[4] Meanwhile the buyers were all paying interest on loans they had received from their employers. Those of them who could not meet the price increases if and when their down payments were to be refunded by the Housing Authority, still stood to lose the interest they had paid on their loans in the interim period. As the victims pointed out in their letter of protest to the State Commissioner for Lands and Housing, Surveys and Urban Development, each victim had in effect borrowed money and paid interest in order to sustain the Housing Authority.....while the Authority received interest free

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[1]East Central State Housing Development Authority: Ref FD20/263 of 7 October 1974: *River-Side Housing Estate: Abakpa Nike, Enugu Phase II.*

[2]East Central State Housing Development Authority: Ref FD:20/Vol vii/26 of 7 January 1975, addressed to the Manager, Loans Office of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos.

[3]Anambra State Housing Development Corporation: *Housing Development Authority Riverside Housing Estate; Ref FD.20/vol 22 of September 1977.*

[4]Central Bank of Nigeria Workers: Petition to the Military Governor of Anambra State on *Abakpa Nike Phase II.* Dated 13 April 1977

loans from the victims at no expense to itself.[1] And as the petitioners summarised in a separate protest letter to the Corporation,

'We are shocked that more than two years have passed, and yet your Corporation have still not allocated any house to any of us despite your promise of handing over the houses to us within 7 months. We were also equally shocked to receive your letter of 17/2/77 offering new prices to us as if we are prospective purchasers. To our greatest surprise, the letter was silent on the amount we have paid all these years, and it is difficult to interpret this silence.

Your Corporation does not appear to us to have exhibited the straightforwardness expected of a Government Agency in this matter.'[2]

Two observations are pertinent at this juncture:

The first is the public policy wisdom of demanding a total cash down payment from applicants for houses before starting their construction. Even the much maligned private sector would not go to that extreme extent. It brings into question, the desirability of public or quasi-public involvement in direct housing construction.

Second, the costs or prices of the houses involved are prohibitive and a close examination of the components of these costs shows that 15 per cent of the total price of a given house is accounted for by overhead expenses alone; another 15 per cent of the price is included to allow for fluctuations in contract prices and 2 per cent is accounted for by landscaping. A clear 32 per cent of the total price of a house is therefore made up of overhead possible variations in contract prices and in landscaping. These are items that would be relatively minimal or non-existent in private sector housing development costs. For certain, the 15 per cent contract variation provision would be absent from private sector costing, so might the 2 per cent landscaping charge, and the overheads might not be much more than 5 per cent as against the 15 per cent in this case. One can infer on the basis of these considerations that these houses would have cost at least 20–25% less in private sector development than they did under the public sector. In a private sector undertaking it would not have taken as long as it did to complete the housing construction, and all the consequent cost loadings would have been avoided. Besides, in private sector development the questionable practice of demanding full cash down payment in advance from a prospective owner would not have applied or in the unlikely case of a breach of contract, the private sector developer would have been liable for court action which the Public agency was not. In contrast, most Public Agencies including the Housing Development Agencies, cannot be sued in courts of law and are not liable for any of their misdeeds.

Federal Housing Authority (FHA)

A similar experience with publicly built or sponsored housing is repeated in the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) Lagos.

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[1] *Protest on the Housing Development Authority Phase II Scheme, River-Side Estate Abakpa-Nike Enugu,* (By the Central Bank of Nigeria Workers concerned, dated 21 January 1976).

[2] Letter of Protest to the General Manager, Anambra State Housing Development Corporation by Central Bank of Nigeria Workers who had paid for the Corporation's Houses; dated 17 May 1977.

The Festac Housing Scheme. In this case, the FHA ballotted for purchase of houses under the scheme and winners were required to pay for the houses they won within 14 days, with the Authority promising to make all the housing units ready for occupation within six months from the date of payment.

But, twelve months after these payments and assurances, the foundations of some of these houses had not been laid, while some winners were allocated empty plots of land. As the petitioners argued,[1]

'The Federal Housing Authority was fully aware that the construction of the majority of the houses was either not completed or not yet begun when in July 1977, it invited all winners to pay, within 14 days, their rents and other charges including deposits against damages and non-payment of electricity bills etc.'

On protest to the Federal Housing Authority, on the non-fulfilment of its parts of the contract, the petitioners were told by the FHA that there was nothing the FHA could do to alleviate the suffering of the winners, as

a their complaints were beyond the Housing Authority because the FHA had no part in the award of the contracts for the construction of the houses in the scheme and thus could not control the contractors;*
b almost all of the contractors had abandoned their work and were nowhere to be found. As a result, most of the contracts for the construction of the houses had been cancelled and new contracts would be awarded;
c the petitioners should consequently, make available to the FHA, three lists of those who would want either to:
i occupy their servants quarters temporarily; or
ii complete their unfinished houses themselves; or
iii undertake to build their units from start to finish.
d the winners should, on their own, approach the few contractors carrying on skeleton jobs in the town, for possible acceleration of the construction.

Thus, the superimposition of one bureaucracy upon the other; the attendant delays in execution time and the resulting high overhead costs; the general inefficiency in costing and the lack of personal considerations, as well as the high cash pre-payments, make publicly sponsored housing overly expensive and restrictive in its accessibility. Only the well-to-do can afford to use such 'services' and the segment of the population (low to middle-income segment) where the real housing problem exists certainly cannot afford them. The impact of direct government housing construction and distribution therefore remain imperceptible. In addition, the

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[1]'An Open Letter to His Excellency, Lt General Olusegun Obasanjo, the Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, by The Winners of Uncompleted Federal Housing Authority Three-Bedroom Units, Lagos', (*Daily Times Newspaper*, Thursday August 24 1978, P.14).

*Apparently, the contracts were awarded direct by the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing, the supervising Authority over the FHA.

injustices and the inequities involved in public direct housing construction as illustrated in the above cases, are too serious to be ignored in future policy reviews on this subject.

GENERAL APPRAISAL

It would appear that this housing policy pattern which appears very glaring today had existed for some time.

An IBRD Study and Report for example, on Problems and Prospects of Nigeria's Economic Development,[1] in the Mid-Sixties, reflected this same policy trend. A summary review of the main observations of this report in respect of housing is pertinent here. It shows that the pattern and features depicted in the foregoing reviews are somewhat continuations or perpetrations of an earlier trend in public sponsored housing.

On housing, the report noted that:

'The total number of houses built by the Lagos Executive Development Board with Government funds was 534. Prices ranged from £1,850 to £5,500. *There were no low-cost houses.*'[2]

The report went on to point out in its section on critical Assessment of Investment Policies that:

'The total annual production of houses resulting from public and private investment together was 4,000 houses per annum, which is far below the minimum housing needs of 6,000 to 7,000 houses per annum.'

and that

'the most striking feature of the official record is the complete failure to produce any low income houses since 1962/63.'[3]

On Northern Nigeria, the Report noted that:

'Government funds were invested mainly in housing for Officials and in Staff housing for hospitals and similar projects. During the first three years of the Plan† the total came to 77 houses, or 26 per annum. None of these could be described as low income house.'[4]

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†The First National Development Plan 1962 – 1968.

[1]International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD): *Economic Growth of Nigeria: Problems and Prospects, 1965, Vol IX: Town and Country Planning.*

[2]*Ibid.* (Annex III) P.3.

[3]*Ibid.*

[4]*Ibid.* (Annex III) P.7.

In respect of Western Nigeria, the report noted that:

'Between 1962/63 and 1964/65, the Western Nigeria Housing Corporation built 245 houses, none of them for low-income occupiers.'[1]

It went on to conclude that:

'The housing policy of the Western Region is socially unbalanced. Low Income housing has been neglected. Public Investment has benefited exclusively the higher income groups.'[2]

From these observations, the inference could be drawn that the public sector impact on the urban housing problem was minimal at best in spite of its acquisition, control and management of substantial amounts of land for residential developments.

In fact, more harm could be said to have been done by public involvement in direct housing construction than the good derived from it, taking into consideration the ever increasing magnitude of compulsory land acquisitions by the public sector, and recently a virtual nationalization of all lands much of which are used for expensive high quality low density housing developments that benefit relatively very few high social status people. Moreover the more land that is acquired by the government, the lsss there is that remains available to the private sector for lower income housing developments.

Although some substantial budgetary allocations have been made for urban land and housing in recent years, these allocations have not been commensurately justified by the quantity of housing units provided by the public sector, nor has its accessibility distribution across the socio-economic spectrum.

HOUSING FINANCE

Direct public housing construction is not the only misdirected approach to housing policy, or the only source of bias in beneficiary incidence of public sponsored housing. This is also affected by the public sector housing credit criteria. Applicants for loans from the Federal Mortgage Bank (a public institution) are first screened by income qualification and a 10% down-payment requirement. Since the mass of the middle and low income are not qualified for its loan scheme, public housing assistance to the bulk of the urban population is virtually non-existent. Relevant, too, is the Federal Mortgage Banks exclusion of applicants who plan to build more than two units of accommodation on the same plot of land. This means that this public mortgage institution would not finance blocks of flats, much less rooming houses, which is the form of accommodation that the majority of those who really experience urban housing problems can afford. In this regard, government efforts at resolving urban housing problems would seem to be directed in favour of the segment of the population where, comparatively speaking, the problem does not exist.

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[1] *Ibid.* (Annex III) P.11.
[2] *Ibid.* (Annex III) P.12.

LESSONS FROM THESE CASES

The logical inference that can be drawn from these examples are that: government is not in a good position to handle the urban housing problem effectively, particularly with the direct housing approach. This is so for the following reasons:

1 Because of the bureaucracies involved, it takes the government much too long to complete housing construction schemes.
2 Houses built directly by public agencies are often far too expensive when compared with similar houses built by the private sector or by individuals. This is because the housing quality standards adopted by public housing agencies are too high, the life styles and forms of government built housing are less varied; the space standards adopted too generous; the combined fees charged by various professionals are too high and the profit margins of contractors engaged in government agency building projects are excessive, coupled with the high overheads of the agency itself, all of which are reflected in the prices of the housing units.[1]
3 Following from its inherent high prices, only a few can afford them and their accessibility severely limited to high income earners.

The sum total of all this is that the government, because of its very nature and mode of operation, is not well-placed to make appreciable impact on the solution of the housing problems. In spite of its enormous resources in funds, manpower, legislative power etc, it lacks effective machinery, and the drive of the profit motive which stimulates rapid production of houses. Government's involvement in direct construction distorts the housing situation without helping in its solution.

THE TENABLE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSING PROBLEM

Government's ineffective impact in the housing problem stems from its basic approach – attempts at direct construction for the general population.

The tenable role of the government in housing should be the incentive–'leveraging' of the production of more housing units through the private sector. This it could do by facilitating the availability of all the inputs into housing i.e. various building materials and housing finance facilities. It could also by incentives stimulate the production of more housing units by creating a favourable policy climate for the private sector. Specifically, its rent control policy should be more discreet and selective so that investors in new residential rental construction are given a few years before their property comes under rent controls. This will allow them to recover initial basic costs, before controls start. This is necessary particularly where the houses had been built from commercial loans. Present indiscriminate and wholesale imposition of rent control, if it were effective, would tend to discourage investments in residential rental construction. Under normal conditions, the private building sector can be trusted to produce many more

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[1]Federal Ministry of Economic Development Lagos and the NISER Ibadan: Report and Recommendations of the National Workshop on Planning Strategy for the 1980s 9–15 January 1978 (P.116).

housing units, with a wide variety of costs on prices, quality and tenure that could provide for the income abilities of a greater cross-section of the population.[1] Neither direct housing construction by the Public Sector nor blanket rent control on all property can achieve this.

The answer must lie in the role of the State as provider of incentives to a private sector which can get on with the job of building houses for the poor as well as the rich.

[1]Okpala, D. C. I. 'Rent Control Reconsidered', in *Nigerian Behavioural Sciences Quarterly* (Forthcoming).

Book Reviews

North-South: A Programme for Survival: The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues *under the Chairmanship of* WILLY BRANDT. *Pan Books London and Sydney,* 1980, Pp. 304. £1.95.

This is generally recognised to be a most important report, covering nearly every aspect of North-South relations, and it is not easy to do justice to it in the framework of a brief review. High expectations have been built up and even if the report does not really live up to all those high expectations, clearly the first statement to make is that if by some kind of miracle the recommendations of this report were to be implemented tomorrow the world would certainly be a better place.

What are the chances of – if not the miracle of 100 per cent implementation tomorrow – at least gradual acceptance of some of the recommendations in the near future? This is largely a question of luck and timing. If we were to enter a period of reasonable harmony and détente with some prospects of lessening the burden of armaments, North-South relations might move to that top place on the international agenda assigned to it as a question of 'survival' by the report. And in that case, if the political will is there, and the necessary priority is given, the programme of the Brandt Report, as a broad reformist and fairly moderate set of proposals, might well provide the heaven-sent and face-saving formula for a new international order. Even then, the commitments of the Russian bloc and of OPEC would have to be much more firmly established than in this much too diplomatic report.

At the moment, however, it looks as if Brandt and his fellow Commissioners have been unlucky in their timing. With Afghanistan and Iran, increases in armament expenditures and heightened East-West tensions seem all too likely. If a summit meeting of the kind suggested by the Brandt Report and to which the policy drive for implementation is shifted were to take place now, its agenda would probably be very different from that envisaged in the Report. The fear of inflation will work against the international Keynesianism and open world trading on which the Brandt Report pins its hopes. The broad emergency programme suggested for 1980–1985 stretches the imagination, in view of the complex international processes involved (in fact, the Brandt Report itself was delayed in publication by half a year). In the event we may be lucky if the emergency programme can *start* in 1985, when *perhaps* the present period of tension may be succeeded by another period of détente.

Some reference has already been made to what appears to this reviewer as double standards applied by the Commission. On the side of its villains it is very free with criticisms of the trans-national corporations, of the IMF and of the Western Governments. On the other hand, it is very delicate – to the point of meekness – in its references to the Soviet bloc, the LDC Governments, the World Bank and, above all, OPEC.

But let us not end on such a grumbling note. The report contains many substantial recommendations which, if not entirely new, are well argued and properly emphasised. Examples of such useful contributions are the proposal to make resource transfers to developing countries more automatic, on the basis of agreed international taxation; the proposals to create an international institution for the financing of mineral exploration in developing countries, which is cogently argued; the creation of the food financing facility under the IMF, etc. The Commission, which was originally proposed by Mr. McNamara to make a case for increased resources for the World Bank, has certainly gone well beyond that initial intention and has provided at least one of the elements for agreed international action once the time is ripe and the political will can be generated.

H. W. SINGER

'Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa', ALI A. MAZRUI; *Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1978;* index; pp. 392; £4.90 paperback.

At Kampala in February 1969 Professor Mazrui took part in a public debate with Mr. Akena Adoko, the Chief General Service Officer of the Uganda Government, to defend his description of an intellectual as a person able to be fascinated by ideas and with the skill to handle some of these ideas effectively. In a reference to that debate, he writes: 'intellectuals may indeed be no more than "mental acrobats", in the words of Akena Adoko. They may indeed often play with ideas for their own sake. Some of the greatest intellectuals in history, including such figures as Plato and Rousseau, have played with ideas and paradoxes partly in the sheer excitement of intellectual brilliance'. (p. 348) While Ali Mazrui's Reith Lectures showed his love of paradox, this book confirms his fascination with ideas. They chase each other across these pages like will-o'-the-wisps as he pursues five main themes: a study of origins; expanding intellectual horizons; the search for relevance; higher education and nation-building; and education, dependency and liberation. Within this framework he examines the processes of politicisation before and after independence; he looks not merely at educational institutions but also at education in its broadest aspects; and he studies above all the educated class itself, tracing its rise and decline, its strengths and weaknesses, and arguing that it is part of an international class.

To the extent that the book draws upon his own rich experience, it is autobiographical – Professor Mazrui is himself a black migrant to the Americas, a precursor of what in his final chapter he calls (in a typically telling phrase), 'the Black Pilgrim Fathers of the 1980s'. But the odd personal anecdote apart (such as the debate with

Akena Adoko and the refusal of the South African authorities to allow his English-born wife to accompany him on a university lecture tour), it is an autobiography of his ideas, as well as a biography of the ideas of the African educated class to which he belongs. Ali Mazrui emerges from these pages as a liberal thinker who accepts that African intellectuals should be socially committed, but firmly rejects any suggestion that they should be social conformists.

The author argues that fundamentally colonialism was a cultural experience and that all educated Africans are still (even if unaware of the fact) 'cultural captives of the West'. The West worships thought ('I think, therefore I am') and this is carried over into modern education in Africa which remains 'too foreign and too rationalist'; this Western intellectual tradition is challenged by President Senghor and others who put forward the idea of emotional involvement – 'I feel, therefore I am'. He defines intellectual dependency as 'excessive reliance on an alien reference group for ideas and analytical guidelines' and argues that 'African Marxism is a system which has been borrowed, often uncritically and totally, from an alien civilization' (pp. 368–370). While non-intellectual leaders, such as President Mobutu Sésé Seko of Zaire, may prompt partial cultural revival, it is up to the intellectuals to provide cultural innovation and thus overcome the tyranny of Western culture. There is perhaps some ambivalence in his own thinking here; if, as he seems to argue, ideas are a universal heritage, the European origin of many of them should be immaterial.

I liked his (somewhat irrelevant) discussion of the oratorical and debating skills of such African leaders as Jomo Kenyatta and Milton Obote, and his shrewd comment that Gandhi was accepted in India 'as a spiritual leader because the society valued the qualities of asceticism and self-discipline which he exemplified', whereas Africa 'has no ascetic tradition of the Hindu kind'. (p. 112). There is good sense, too, in his argument that 'much of the educated manpower in black Africa should be functionally versatile rather than functionally specialized', (p. 226) while those of us who are saddened by the increase in overseas students' fees will underline his statement that 'What ought to be remembered is that a successful sale of cultural goods helps to expand the market for economic goods'. (p. 292) Some of his hypotheses about Islam in Africa and his statement that within the fragile social structures of the new states students should debate rather than demonstrate are contentious, while his discussion of the formula for development in Africa – 'modernization minus dependency' *or* 'modernization and decolonization' – could usefully have been carried further.

I am uncertain of the audience to which these essays are addressed. University students of political science and education will benefit from reading them, while the general reader will find much to interest him. He will be impressed alike by Professor Mazrui's skilful handling of ideas, the quality of his writing and the breadth of his knowledge (though he should read about student power in Rashdall's study of medieval universities). I myself found the essays both stimulating and provocative, and I enjoyed reading them. However, at the end of this book I could

not help wishing that Professor Mazrui had distributed his largesse rather less generally – my own preference would have been for in-depth analysis of fewer ideas.

WILLIAM TORDOFF

Africa in the Colonial Period III. The Transfer of Power: The Colonial Administrator in the Age of Decolonisation, A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE (Ed); *University of Oxford Facility Committee for African Studies, 1979;* pp vi, 194; £5.25 (in UK) & £7.00 (overseas by airmail)

This is the report of the third of a series of symposia organized in Oxford to place on record the thoughts about the British Empire in Africa of those who actually ran it. This record is of central importance in that it is concerned with the personal feelings and thoughts of those who constituted 'the Administration' in the critical period of decolonization. In seven chapters it covers the spectrum of responsibility from the level of the Colonial Office to that of the District Officer, and finally to the problems of Africanisation at the lowest working levels of government.

The danger of such gatherings (it included a great number of decorated veterans, CMG's, CBE's and so on, at their head Viscount Boyd of Merton and Sir James Robertson, GCMG, GCVO) is that of self-congratulation: 'nothing in his life became him like the leaving of it'. On the whole, this is avoided; there is a decent amount of breast-beating about reluctance to accept the passing of traditional Africa, about distaste for lawyers and school certificate boys, about failure to find and train African successors in the administrative tradition. But what is most notable is that the assembled expatriates (no black African is recorded as attending) come across as decent, friendly, and competent people, who liked Africans but were less friendly to white settlers and to developers in search of a quick buck (and these were of various creeds and colours).

Perhaps 'we shall not look upon their like again'. The culture from which they came (by no means solely a public school and Oxbridge culture) is changing as fast as those which they supervised in Africa, and they must all feel uncertainty about the importance of their sons and grandsons.

And of their daughters and grand-daughters. The wives earn a brief mention on page 104, and one or two distinguished academic ladies were present at the symposium. But there is nothing here to help new generations or culturally different observers to feel again the atmosphere and the anxieties of social life in the District setting. One problem (apart from intimate family problems) was that of absorbing not only Africans but their wives into the social proprieties of a strange but friendly culture. Another problem which I could observe as District staff expanded, was that of absorbing into the District 'team' not only the heads of other services but also their wives and the wives of their juniors. The social life of the administration (as complementary to its work) appears very little in this volume; perhaps it will be recorded more fully in the archive of personal papers which is

being built up in Oxford. Or perhaps the flavour of colonial service life has gone beyond reconstruction.

W. J. M. MacKenzie

The Political Economy of Peru 1956–78: Economic Development and the Restructuring of Capital, E. V. K. FitzGerald; *Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979*; pp 360; statistical appendix; notes; bibliography; index; £17.50.

A common remark about the Peruvian revolutionary government of 1968–78 was that they were successful because they expanded involvement in the national state from 5% to 15% of the population. The leaders of the government became angry when versions of the statement found their way into print and it is a distortion of reality but, in many ways it reflects reality. It is with that 5% to 15% that FitzGerald deals. That is not a criticism because it is also that 5% to 15% that matters to the outside world.

He does an excellent job of describing three Peruvian attempts to restructure capital beginning with the Prado government of what he calls the 'grand bourgeosie' (1952–62), through the liberal technocratic government of Belaunde (1963–68), through the reformist-military, state capitalism regime of Velasco and the armed forces (1968–78). The military are in the process of turning the government back to an approved civilian administration, a familiar pattern in Peru. They were influential during the Prado regime, they seized power a few weeks after the 1962 election to prevent Haya De la Torre from being president, and allowed the 1963 election of Belaunde to stand. FitzGerald's account of their ten year reign, at least the macro-economic aspects of it, it the best one I have seen. The Prado alliance of the Peruvian financial elite and foreign (mainly U.S.) capital with military and police used for labour repression; and the Belaunde social democratic reforms, protected economy, and welfare, at least for the elite of the urban and coastal work force; have been described in other works. The contribution of this book, particularly, is in the description of the military's attempts to institute ownership reforms, worker control of industry and opposition to foreign capital, while maintaining military control and contact with foreign capital. Not being especially ideological, except for his committment to modern socialist-capitalist macro-economics, Fitzgerald presents a balanced analysis of the regime's successes and failures.

He indicates that heavy external borrowing, plus an inability to control surplus and to build a popular base, have led to relinquishing control to foreign banks and a scaling down of governmental activity. He then goes on to point out that the military and the two previous administrations have done a lot to modernize the economy, develop local industry and infrastructure, extend welfare, and establish some control over foreign trade and investment. He warns against the continued neglect of peasant agriculture. His conclusion, which he characterizes as 'a gross oversimplification,' is that, 'On the periphery of the world economy, successful

capitalist industrialization..... requires the freedom for domestic capital to work out its own compromise with manufacturing multinationals, supported rather than rivalled by the public sector, and with a labour force contained by a hegemonic state, itself underpinned either by the military or a strong party system' (301).

As an anthropologist with thirty years experience working in Peru with Quechua speaking Indians and urban squatters I was fascinated by and frustrated by the book. It has one page on peasant agriculture (89) and in one note (28) mentions Quechua speaking Indians. Since probably 20% of Peruvians are mono-lingual in Quechua or Aymara and another 20% speak one or both of those languages it seems a serious omission. Since Indians had more land under cultivation when the Europeans came than are cultivated now, and since they exploited ecological areas ranging from coastal desert, through mountain areas 13,000 feet high, to Amazon rain forest and produced a comfortable surplus there might be something to learn at home as well as from the techniques of international agri-business. I did learn governmental rationales for various activities that seemed quite insane from the point of view of mountain Indians and urban squatters.

It would be much more difficult but quite as valuable if someone could do a book similar to this one from the point of view of the substantial majority of the population to whom the minor variations of White, urban, Lima (and foreign) power, whether called capitalist, socialist communist, Nasserist, Maoist, or whatever, are seen as devices for taking from them and delivering nothing in return. From their point of view, why should the state control surplus? It there is a land reform why is an army major or government employee stepping into the same role previously played by the private (local or foreign) company overseer? The very nature of the 'failures' of the last three administrations to modernize, rationalize and control the country may be the reason the country has remained relatively stable in spite of what appears to be economic disaster. The very 'dualism' he and other economists bemoan may be an asset in Peru and it might be wise to encourage it.

Many peasants have eaten their surplus or traded it in the vast marketing system that exists alongside the official one. Many urban squatters have invested their time and money in building, renting and selling their own houses. Small enterprise abounds and even hardheaded 'rational' economists are surprised when they get a glimpse of the vast and complex networks of the 'informal sector.' FitzGerald's work is a fine piece of scholarship but I would have been happier if he had, at least, made a bow to the other 85%.

WILLIAM MANGIN

Third World Women Speak Out, P. HUSTON: *New York, Praeger Publishers, 1979*; appendices; illustrated; pp. xix+153; £3.75 paperback.

Perdita Huston believed it important that the voices of women implicated in the planning for the third UN Development Decade should be heard at the conference table. First, someone had to go out and listen to them where they were, in the fields,

in clinics, training centres and offices. She visited six developing countries, and had lengthy open-ended discussions with nearly 200 women, of various levels of education, and from both rural and urban areas. Her primary focus was on attitudes to family planning, and her findings on that topic have been published separately*. The present book, on change, development and basic needs, is drawn from the mass of additional material obtained.

In 'Third World Women Speak Out', the author has imposed a thematic structure on the material, each theme being introduced in general terms and illustrated by extended quotations from selected interviews. The themes are:

Positive and negative perceptions of change
Women within the family
A legacy of social constraints
Nutrition, health and family planning
Learning, work and aspirations
Political participation and leadership

She focuses on the 'commonalities' of values among women in the different cultures represented (Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Mexico), and thus provides information, not only on the preoccupations but also on the direction of women's thinking and the sources of influence on their ideas. She concludes with a set of specific proposals for action based on the suggestions of the women themselves.

In an appendix, the results of a more systematic content analysis of interviews is presented. Unfortunately, this independent assessment by staff of the International Centre for Research on Women was an afterthought and not part of the original project design. The authors of this section, while making clear the statistical limitations of the material for purposes of generalisation, draw out a more refined set of sub-themes, rank-ordering them in terms of frequency of mention. These might usefully form a starting point for more formal investigation. For example, the analysis calls in question any broad assumptions about the negative impact of socio-economic change on women and suggests that the negative impact is specifically associated with economic conditions.

This book is important because so little has been reported of how women experience and interpret the impact of social and economic change on their lives and where their priorities lie. This has had serious consequences. For example, the significant influence of men, for good and ill, on the choices open to women in regard to their health, diet, education and many other key areas of their lives, is too often ignored in women's educational programmes.

Nonetheless, while appreciating Perdita Huston's answer to the call to 'tell it how it is', and the authenticity of her sympathetic encounters with her subjects, this

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*Huston, Perdita: *'Message from the village'*, N.Y., The Epoch B Foundation, 1978.

reviewer finds the document itself an unsatisfactory hybrid. While straining after both persuasiveness and scientific respectability, the author has produced what is neither a set of case studies, a systematic analysis, nor, indeed, a purely journalistic account. Any one of these styles of presentation might have done more justice to the material, and thus increased its impact. This does not detract from the fact that what the women she quotes have to say, whether poor and illiterate or educated and socially mobile, is worth hearing. Anyone working in the field of development planning would do well to listen.

JANCIS SMITHELLS

The Boat People, An 'Age' Investigation, with BRUCE GRANT, *Penguin 1979*, with maps, chronology and index; pp 209; £1.50.

There are still boat people crossing the South China Sea from Vietnam, but the fashions and fears of the media have moved our attention to other objects. It is perhaps fortunate for our self-respect. For the story of the boat people is so appalling, its moral indictment of the established powers so crushing, hypocrisy cries out for relief. The pretensions of liberal democracy and proletarian communism are almost equally damned – the Vietnamese drove them out under the threat of Chinese attack; the Soviet Union and the United States backed, covertly or not, the play of their clients; and the world's powers, protesting horror and self-righteousness, clanged shut their gates – with one small chink left open for desirable immigrants (age in the early thirties, married with two children, healthy, highly educated etc.). In a realistic world, the good Samaritan could not possibly stop to help those caught in a massacre; his goodness must be restricted to the odd isolated case of assault, the solitary 'dissident'. The quality of mercy is not only strained, its flow is strictly controlled by foreign policy objectives.

The Australian newspaper, the *Age*, has, with the aid of a distinguished Australian journalist, put together that first years of the story of the boatpeople. The book is overly long, but in the main, cool and factual. That makes the savageries inflicted upon the boat people even more intolerable. The boat people are not alone, for refugees round the globe have easily comparable experience of what happens to those who reject the local State, the baron to whom all must be serfs. But the boat people are different in one sense, for the issue became very public and governments were obliged to take explicit attitudes. While the devastation continued, the rationalizations for inaction, the hypocrisies heaped higher and higher.

There is Lee Kuang Yew explaining that if Singapore were to accept a refugee, 'we would not only be encouraging those responsible to force even more refugees to flee but also unwittingly demonstrating that a policy of inhumanity does pay dividends'. There is Malaysia, shooing the sinking boats back out to sea. There is Japan, throwing up clouds of instant mythology to justify heartlessness ('the Japanese way of life does not permit settlers to come here from alien cultures'). And there is the British Government, saying that Britain can do nothing because it has already accepted 'two or three millions' from Asia since the war; these figures were

inaccurate for those in Britain born in Asia, and many of the people concerned were not refugees but admitted in order to increase the British gross national product.

But what is also impressive is that, left to themselves, ordinary people responded so much better than their governments. The French and Canadian governments were alarmed to find that popular generosity in their countries want so much further than the thin gruel of official compassion. And in the South China Sea itself, along with the pirates, the armed coastal patrols, and the hundreds of ship captains who ignored the cries of the drowning, there were many others, saints – such as, for example, Captain Healey Martin* of the s.s. Sibonga (Bank Line). He fished out of their sinking boats 1,003 people, including 403 children. He had no assurance the British Government would admit them – and indeed, for some time London tried to shuffle off responsibility solely on to Captain Martin – or that the Bank Line would not sack him for substituting refugees for his legitimate commercial cargo. Here is a somewhat more worthy candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize than we have seen of late.

The numbers of refugees in the world has grow enormously. They are a symptom of the distemper in the body politic. Given the increasing vendettas between the States of the world, their numbers will almost certainly continue to grow. One of the Vietnamese explained the responses of the world's governments in terms of their nightmares:

'We show you in a terrible way how fragile the world we live in is... The massacre of the Jews was your first warning. We are your second'.

Training Administrators for Development, WYN REILLY, *Heinemann, London 1979.*

This is a concise introduction to the subject of training in the public service, of interest to all involved in management training, though focussing on the particular problems of training administrators under conditions associated with rapid change and resource constraint.

The first two chapters – Introduction and Training – are mainly concerned with defining the subject to be examined and clarifying terms and issues. Various aspects of training are systematically discussed in the following seven short chapters, ranging from the design and content of training programmes, to methods, characteristics and problems of trainees, course evaluation and the advantages and disadvantages of different types of training organisation. The Conclusion summarises the author's arguments, confirming the relevance of administrative training, and emphasising the importance of quality in training practice.

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*Mrs Martin has since received a well-deserved award for her role in saving the lives of boat people rescued by her husbands efforts (Ed).

Among several welcome aspects of this book are a lack of pretentiousness, a freedom from jargon and over-complex analysis, a drawing together in a conenient volume of the main points of numerous articles and papers, and above all a practical and sensible approach to the subject. The author, experienced both as an academic and civil servant, writes from the perspective of a practitioner, perceiving training as an instrument for improving public service performance to which end all others should be subordinate. Underlying an objective statement of issues and controversies, is an impatience with the low level of effectiveness frequently accepted by many training institutions, despite the considerable resources devoted to their operation. While in Chapter 2 Reilly attributes some of the causes of failure to the difficulties imposed by the environment of developing countries, in Chapters 8 and 9 he criticises training institutions themselves especially for their detachment from the values and purposes for which they were first established. The author makes no claim to offer new ideas on the subject as a whole. This is not an academic study; footnotes are not used and the bibliography is short. What he does offer is a well ordered summary of the essentials of his subject inviting the reader to examine critically his own assumptions and practice. Much of what is written applies equally to training institutions in Britain as to those overseas.

Criticism may be directed to the generality of this book, and its superficial treatment of familiar issues. The first has undoubted substance, though the author had little latitude in a work of this scope and length. While many constructive points and recommendations are made their significance in a specific situation is not illustrated. Case examples would have undoubtedly added to the impact of the work as a whole, and to a fuller understanding of the implications of the writer's own viewpoint. A successor volume of comparative studies would be valuable.

As to the second, while Reilly has presented a survey of the well known this is not in itself a fault – the well known is not necessarily well understood. Many of the issues raised are not positively faced in practice, and much current criticism of administrative training indicates that this appraisal is both necessary and timely. This book is certainly recommended for the public servants for whom it is intended, and for students generally of public administration. It is a valuable and practical general reference.

MALCOLM NORRIS

Broadcasting in the Third World: Promise & Performance; ELIHU KATZ & GEORGE WEDELL: *Macmillan, 1978*; Tables, Appendices, Index pp. 305; £7.95

This study is the result of research over the period 1973–5 which brings together information on radio and television broadcasting in 91 developing countries, expanded by case studies in 11 of them. The emphasis is on the process – objectives, organisation, content – resulting from the transfer from the developed to the developing countries.

The First part places broadcasting in the context of the socio-economic development process. It sets out the general policy themes of the 1950s–60s,

concentrating particularly on national integration, socio-economic development and cultural expression where the media potentially have a particular role to play. The second section traces the process whereby the broadcasting institutions were introduced to developing countries, the structures that resulted and the modifications that have been made to the original Western models to meet the changing situations and requirements of the developing countries. The authors then examine the output of the radio and television networks, first in terms of the content of the programme schedules and then in relation to national policy statements, and they demonstrate the divergence between the promise and the performance which can be attributed to a variety of factors, such as the lack of a coherent national policy, direct government control and bureaucratic structures, and failures in supporting systems, such as the supply of radio batteries through the retail outlets. Finally, they offer suggestions for the direction of future development, some derived from interesting innovations already in existence, such as community television viewing around Kaduna, Northern Nigeria.

The authors demonstrate the failure of television to make any impact beyond the elite in urban areas, and the constraints of both manpower and technology are severely limiting factors in mobilising national television for the development process. The promise of intensive educational broadcasting for schools has not been realised either, largely because all the elements of the associated infrastructure of institutions and technology have so far eluded attempts to integrate them.

The chief value of this book is that it draws together material from a wide variety of sources, expanded by the case studies, to produce a broad picture of the state of broadcasting in the developing countries. Detail is inevitably lost, but such a review is timely. The authors go to some length to establish that they are concerned with evaluation in terms of the declared objectives of the politicians and national leaders of the developing countries. As these are so often couched in terms of general political rhetoric, the conclusion that performance has failed to measure up to the objectives is hardly surprising. However, the specifics of the broadcasting scene add another dimension to aid in the understanding of the development process and problems.

This book should prove a useful point of departure for future comparative or longitudinal studies, and offers some challenging suggestions for future directions in broadcasting development in the Third World.

MARY KEMPE

Tales from the Dark Continent, Images of British Colonial Africa in the Twentieth Century CHARLES ALLEN (Ed); *Andre Deutsch, British Broadcasting Corporation*; Illustrated, glossary; pp 165; £6.95.

Like Tony Kirk-Greene in his admirable Preface, this reviewer recognises the authentic echoes of an administrative career in Africa in Charles Allen's well-selected vignettes produced in this volume.

It is suggested that colonial administrators often obtained Thirds at Oxbrige: of my own vintage only one entrant had failed to obtain a Second – maybe in West Africa it was otherwise, who knows? Certainly, as Tony Kirk-Greene points out we suffer from the uninformed allegation that we were only interested in law and order, never in socio-economic development. Originally, in early days of 'pacification', law and order was to be established first. Latterly: between the two great wars, and above all once the Second World War was over, encouraged by such as Andrew Cohen and Creech Jones, development plans soon had their place in every national and local authority budget. Up to independence the Sudan remained the land of Blacks ruled by Blues – a half blue from Badminton once got in (but he was also a pilot in the University Air Squadron) but the level of administration was exceptionally high.

The Administrative environment varied within countries let alone as between countries in the same region or on different sides of Africa. Yet one can read these chapters with no apparent lack of sequence and a remarkable absence of non sequiturs.

Certainly Northern Nigeria with its reputed polo-playing as a required skill, enjoyed a particular prestige, but how far did applicants choose the West for its more frequent home leaves rather than for status? Tony Kirk-Greene applied for other countries and expresses his good fortune in being sent to Nigeria. Was not Tanganyika's invalid Governor Battershill renowned for his Colonial Office days in charge of military recruitment: if you set your heart on the Somali Camel Corps you were likely to be enrolled in the Gold Coast Regiment and vice versa.

Particular praise is due to the publishers for the very pleasing format of the book; for its well reproduced old photographs, for its black and white sketches – for the nostalgia they arouse for Walters of 10 The Turl, Oxford – how we would go for free beer to see the tropical kit London firms set out in a local pub, and how almost all of us then proceeded to Walters to place our orders. How convenient it was not to have to start paying the bill (over £100!) until one was settled in overseas. Later, how pleasant to have such a dependable firm purchase and despatch one's Christmas presents while one was far away in wartime Africa.

In a book that covers so many different people, in various African countries, over half a century, editing is a monumental task and a few errors (eg Frank Lloyd, pp 71, did not go to Tanganyika) are readily forgiven. A pity, however that so many mistakes are to be found in the comparatively few words of Kiswahili included in the glossary:

The usual and proper word for bath is chakogea (ie from oga or Koga the verb for bathe or take a bath); Jambo is misprinted Janbo; 'umpeschie' is some strange kisettler concoction for upishi – the profession of cooking, cookery; (Ku) dona in Swahili means to peck or kiss; the Swahili for an Ayah is Yaya; Kiboko is a hippo not a rhino; bwana has always meant Mr and on occasions 'Master', bwana Mkubwa (not makuba) distinguished say the DC from the cadet (a bwana mdogo); mzungu means European. These errors could easily have been corrected.

Nonetheless this is a book full of charm and nostalgia for all surviving African administrators. No doubt future historians will read and smile and some may scorn for want of understanding, but here is a light, lively, piece of mainly oral history which students of Britain's short-lived Imperial role on the dark continent will be reading for a long time to come.

PETER JOHNSTON

Book Notes

Organisational Systems for National Planning, Department of Technical Co-operation for Development; *United Nations, New York*; pp 177; $(US) 13.00.

As Professor Chi-Yuen Wu's emphasises in his important contribution to this major UN monograph, development planning has several administrative aspects, including 'the setting up of organisations and the establishment of appropriate processes for planning, including the preparation, implementation, evaluation and modification of development plans'. National planning requires effective implementation if goals are to be achieved and unless the plans are tailored to the available administrative capacity, these goals will not be reached. Few will disagree with Professor Wu's conclusions: 'In waging war against underdevelopment, all available techniques for the mobilisation of resources should be fully exploited'. Organisation means not just creating the formal structure, but staffing all departments with staff of the right calibre, staff who are motivated and who are provided with good personnel administration.

Besides Professor Wu, Jozef Pajestka writes on institutionalisation of national development planning in European countries beyond the Iron Curtain, and Aleksander Lukaszewicz writes in general terms on a Functional Approach to the administrative arrangements needed for development planning. The former points out that 'the central planning body, by being excessively engaged in exercising power and central management, is unable to undertake proper execution of the fundamental task of strategy elaboration'. The latter emphasises that for effective planning, a pre-requisite is the efficient functioning of the organisations at national level concerned with the 'socio-economic, geophysical, technological, financial, organisational and administrative dimensions' of the planning problem.

Only Professor Wu touches on the most important dimension of all, the political decision-makers – not just decisions that affect the drafting and implementation of plans, but also the decisions which govern the philosophy on which the political system operates and with which national motivation must be in sufficient support if socio-economic development is really to improve man's lot.

Inside the Third World, PAUL HARRISON; *Penguin Books* maps, index; pp 480; £2.95.

Paul Harrison is an experienced journalist with, it is clear, deep sympathy for the peoples in the poorer countries of the Third World. He allows himself to be described on the fly-leaf as a 'part time peasant on a small allotment with problematical soil' – one hopes not in order to suggest that he identifies himself with the really poor peasant cultivation in the tropics for that would incongruous.

In Asia, in much of Africa, and in much, too, of Latin America, the quarter of a century since World War II has seen an overall increase in productivity more than offset by the rapid increase in population growth. Paul Harrison calls for a 'Marshall Plan' for the Third World, a call that should be echoing round the world – but it does not, in part, at least, because the new rich of OPEC threaten the living standards of the Old West. Without a Marshall Plan the author foresees a world of continuing revolutions and fascist dictatorships (no doubt be they fascists of the intolerable right or fascists of the intolerable marxist left).

Maybe man is hell-bent on destroying himself: but the great mass of the World's rural peasantry and urban poor must at the very least deserve a real effort by the leaders in the North and in the South to let social justice prevail.

Paul Harrison, keen on the good catch-line, keen on the instance of a tough case to illustrate a particular point as he hastens his reader from country to country, and continent to continent, throws in statistics without enough data upon which to make valid judgements. Because the green revolution has enabled land owners to produce more and become richer, to consolidate holdings at the expense of landless men, he leaves the reader with the inference that the green revolution is to blame for continuing inequalities. This, of course, is nonsense. More foodstuffs have been produced to help feed an over increasing world population. Man has not yet geared the use of the new crops to man's own full benefit – the fault lies clearly with Governments not with new varieties of seed!

Again, Paul Harrison seems to enjoy blaming the West for most of the Third World's ills. But Burns' lament on man's inhumanity is of world-wide validity and system-wide application. Pacific Islands were no havens of peace before Westeners appeared bringing both good and evil with them; the Middle East no Eden before Crusaders clashed with Saracens; the horrors of the slave trade were not peculiar in the West: East and Central Africa long suffered the depredation of Arab slavers. Paul Harrison has an unanswerable case for concerted international action to relieve the extreme poverty in the Third World, but it is far from certain whether anyone really has a practical solution to offer.

Science and Science Policy in the Arab World; A. B. ZAHLAN; *Croom Helm*; diagrams, tables, appendices and index; pp 205; £13.95.

Dr Zahlan is much more than a distinguished physicist: his scholarship extends over the broad field of scientific activity in the Arab world. He points to the long established dependence on the turnkey method in the Middle East and North Africa. For 170 years Arab governments seeking quick technical improvements have turned to expatriate experts rather than to training their own citizens to acquire the needed expertise.

Despite available funds and an increasing number of institutions for higher level education and training, 'yet only limited and weak linkages exist between elements of the science, technology and development trilogy'.

Among interesting points mentioned are the likely opening in Egypt, in 1980, of a Research Institute for Science and Atomic Energy: the probable increase in the incidence of Bilharzia resulting from the Aswan High Dam: the Solar Energy Group in Kuwait which has been engaged *inter alia* with desalinization schemes.

The Middle East now occupies and immensely important strategic, political and economic role in world affairs. Dr Zahlan's book will help many to appreciate the Arab situation and its appeal should be not only to scientists but to planners and economists, politicians and sociologists as well.

Where the Grass is Greener – living in a unequal world, DAVID M. SMITH; *Penguin Books, 1979* pp 380 (paperback); £2.50.

This book offers a geographical perspective on inequality. It seeks to reveal the nature and extent of spatial variations in living standards at different geographical scales: national, regional urban and neighbourhood. It offers no dramatic solutions, but should provide the basis for a better understanding of the origins of inequality as a spatial condition in both industrially advanced and less developed societies. It is very readable, well illustrated, and good value for £2.25.

Research Report No 54

Diversity Regionalism and National Unity, MOHAMED OMER BESHIR; *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1979*; pp 50.

Research Report No 55

Modern African History: Some Historical Observations, TORE LINNÉ ERIKSEN; *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1979*; pp 27.

Research Report No 54

This little booklet is presented in a scholarly manner, but it is scholarship of mythology not history that is provided. Had the author concentrated on Angola where Basil Davidson's special knowledge lies, he might have avoided some of the pitfalls which were encountered. He seems to enjoy a perverse guilt-ridden complex that all Africa's ills are European-made. He puts a lot of focus on East Africa: but Arab caravans, Arab slave-raiders devastating the hinterland, were not worth a mention compared to exploitive European missionaries! European land-occupiers are well caned; needless to say there is no mention that Africa and possibly the world's largest sisal estate (and others too) were Indian owned.

Future African historians will have quite a task when they come to disentangle fact from fiction as they examine the form in which it is now alas all too often portrayed.

Research Report No 55

Professor Beshir's report has much more substance. He writes with authority on the Sudan and its cultural diversity. He prefers to differentiate between cultural areas and linguistic 'stocks' in Africa rather than between tribes. He does not readily accept the 'North and South' of the Sahara as a permanent cultural division. He very rightly deplores 'tribalism'. He quotes from an UNESCO paper by Agbo to play down the tribal theme, suggesting that the very word carries a connotation that is deprecatory of Africans. Maybe: and certainly national unity in new African States must eschew tribalism if national development is to be successful. This reviewer recalls a leader on Kilimanjaro telling a UN visiting mission that unless his people received more educational assistance they would lose their position as the premier tribe in the country. There was plenty of praiseworthy tribal pride and tribal consciousness with no aspersion implied, but this had to give way to National pride and consciousness after independence.

International Development Administration: Implementation Analysis for Development Projects: GEORGE HONADLE and RUDI KLAUSS (Eds); *Holt Saunders, Eastbourne, England (Praeger Special Studies)*; Tables, Figures, Index; pp 221; £13.00.

This volume contains 12 essays by a largely Maxwell School, Syracuse/Development Alternatives Inc team, with a contribution apiece from Harvard and the University of Hawaii.

With something of a fanfare the contributors indicate that they are offering something new – a real alternative to the ostrich's head-in-sand approach to project design. They offer a nine-PhD-strong 'think-tank' but, alas, it is very difficult to find anything that is actually new – nothing that, for example, Professor Chi-Yuen Wu has not been saying for a very long time. In fact the contributions are really rather old-fashioned, still proclaiming the belief that Third World Administration is new, that it is 'development administration' – an argument long since demolished by Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie.

Rural and urban income inequalities in Indonesia, Mexio, Pakistan, Tanzania and Tunisia, WOUTER VAN GINNEKEN; *International Labour Office (World Employment Study), Geneva, 1976*, pp 67; Francs (Swiss) 15.00.

This is a study of certain income inequalities in five countries, based upon recent household sample surveys. The author seeks to identify national inequality, and inequality within and between urban and rural sectors. He finds that these inequalities vary with the 'level of economic development' (as indicated by per capita gross domestic product). Finally, the author uses the data to assess the levels of 'absolute poverty', and discusses policy measures that might be employed to diminish the identified inequalities and lessen poverty. The study is, in the main, of specialized interest.

Roots of traditional personality development among the Zaramo in coastal Tanzania, ANJA FORSSEN; *Central Union for Child Welfare in Finland*; illustrated, tables: pp 159.

This is a very seriously undertaken study, yet it is scarcely profound. This is probably due to the professional interest of the author in comparing African village children of the Dar es Salaam coastal area, with children in Finland. The environment of each country is poles apart, climatically, culturally and economically. It could only be from the pen of an over-serious scholar that the conclusion is solemnly drawn that the

'"dangers and victories" of psychological development.....(is).....in many respects different for the Zaramo children from what they are among children growing up within a Western cultural framework.'

What makes this book of unusual interest is that it is not the product of an anthropologist or a sociologist, but of a psychiatrist – albeit assisted by an experienced anthropologist.

One particular reservation needs to be expressed. It it how far do villagers and especially village children, provide truthful and accurate replies to what must often seem a very strange lot of mumbo jumbo questions. There is reference to the seclusion of the adolescent Zaramo girl when as a mwali she lives in a hut on her own, often, to put it crudely, being fattened up for the marriage market. There is no word of criticism here for this practice, no mention of the anachronism of such an attitude towards teenagers being acceptable in this age of the liberated woman.

A Comparative Approach to Policy Analysis – Health Care in four nations. HOWARD M. LEICHTER; *Cambridge University Press*; appendices, bibliography, index; pp 326.

Germany, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Japan form the four-nation subject for Howard Leichter's study.

Between the introduction of the Poor Laws and the era of the early almshouse, and first Factory Acts and then the development of a social security system, lay a long period of laissez-faire. When one is thinking of man's Twentieth Century gross inhumanity to his fellow man, it is perhaps salutary to read of the horrific hours of work undertaken by young children between 5 and 12 years old in English Nineteenth Century cotton mills.

While this volume is full of interest, Leichter has not really desciplined himself to focus fully on the subject he has chosen. We end, for example not with a comparative assessment of health policies in the four nations, but with 'implications for the USA' and as the index shows, he jumps round the globe with all too many rather superficial glances.

Decent Interval: the American Debacle in Vietman and the Fall of Saigon; FRANK SHEP; *Penguin Books*; maps, index; pp 496; £2.95.

This is a well written if overlong, largely personalised account of the collapse of South Vietnam in the face of North Vietnamese persistence and American anxiety to withdraw as quickly as a face-saving formula could be found.

Frank Shep paints the picture of the death throes of Saigon with feeling and with sympathy. If anyone wants to know what happened at the end, this now is the story in full from an inside viewpoint.

Why did the Americans fail? Shep does not look seriously at the full picture. The rot set in

when President Diem was overthrown and murdered; his overthrow not without American support..... Corruption followed, drugs encouraged its spread. The Ho Chi Minh trail enabled the North Vietnamese to traverse Cambodia at will and to make a nonsense of the norms of military defence.

One cannot read an account of the ending of the Vietnam War without a feeling of deep repugnance for those who will not allow the Vietnamese to live in peace. The French, then the Americans, then the Sino-Kampuchea involvement – another Thirty Year War fought with all the horrific impact of modern arms, with the North Vietnamese all too willing participants.

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